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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE PERCEPTUAL AND INTERACTIVE ASPECTS OF

THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR:

THE ISRAELI VIEWPOINT

BY



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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled THE PERCEPTUAL AND INTERACTIVE ASPECTS OF THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR: THE ISRAELI VIEW-POINT submitted by JAMES C. McDAVID in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of ARTS.

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ABSTRACT

As the title suggests, this thesis has two broad purposes. The five month period prior to the June, 1967 Arab-Israeli War is examined using event data analysis and content analysis. The two approaches, as adapted for this study, are in fact complementary.

Chapter I consists of a discussion of crisis decision-making theory and research with the objective of developing an empirically testable framework for the analysis of crisis decision-making. O.R. Holsti's work is used as a reference point and four of his hypotheses regarding the effects of stress on perceptions of time and alternatives are presented with the intention of testing them in terms of the Six Day War case.

Chapter II introduces the interactions analysis of this period. Because event data are used for the analysis, the researcher is presented with the opportunity to exploit its potential in terms of the question of whether and to what extent the key actors in the Six Day War behaved as members of a subordinate system prior to the War.

Chapter III presents the results of the interactions analysis. Event data are used to show that Israel, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt did behave as members of a Middle East subordinate system. The patterns of conflict between Israel and her three principal neighbors are also mapped for the five month period.

Chapter IV presents the perceptual analysis of the period. The data generated from the content analysis of all available documents of selected Israeli decision-makers are used to test the framework for crisis decision-making developed in Chapter I. Holsti's four hypotheses are tested together with the two indicators of the concept of stress. The data are also used to derive an Index of Injury for the period prior to the War. The discussion ends with the presentation of eight correlations that are performed between the event data and the perceptual data.

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CHAPTER I

This chapter will consist of a social psychological framework for the analysis of crisis decision-making. Special emphasis will be placed on the status of the concept of crisis and an attempt will be made to "operationalize" the concept of psychological stress. Since this concept has been treated as an independent variable by O.R. Holsti, it is possible to test hypotheses relating stress to aspects of the decision-making process.¹ Four such hypotheses will be discussed and an attempt will be made to ascertain their theoretical significance.

The phrase "crisis decision-making" itself suggests a complex process which requires some explication. In order to do this a brief history of decision-making is in order.

Richard C. Snyder and his associates, H.W. Bruck and B. Sapin were the first political theorists to lay out a comprehensive framework for the analysis of foreign policy decision-making. In terms of the present discussion, it is important to emphasize that one of their three

¹O.R. Holsti, "The 1914 Case", American Political Science Review, Vol. 59, 1965, p. 366.

basic assumptions was:

Nation-state action is determined by the way in which a situation is defined subjectively by those charged with the responsibility for making choices. (a) In effect, this implies a frame of reference with the "state as a collective actor in a situation" as the core concept.²

Thus, the perceptions of the decision-makers are assumed to be decisive in the decision-making process.

To place the Snyder approach in perspective, that is, to summarize its concepts for the discussion of developments in decision-making, another quote from the same source is appropriate:

Given identified, authoritative decision-makers, an organizational system, a communications network (internal and external), decision-making consists in the combining of values, attitudes, information and perceptions and situation into a course of action.³

Since the Snyder and Paige study of the decision to intervene in Korea was in fact a study of crisis decision-making, there would seem to be a validity problem in making generalisations to the process of decision-making in general. In fact, as studies of decision-making continued, and as the nuclear arms race became a more salient

²R.C. Snyder and G. Paige, "The U.S. Decision To Resist Aggression in Korea: The Application of An Analytic Scheme," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 3, 1958-1959, p. 366.

³Ibid., p. 374.

feature in international relations, a tendency developed to conceptualize crisis situations as being characterized by unique parameters, which distinguished them from "ordinary" decision-making situations. Charles F. Hermann was among the first political scientists to define an organizational crisis. His definition was formulated along three dimensions:

An organizational crisis (1) threatens high-priority values of the organization, (2) presents a restricted amount of time in which a response can be made, and (3) is unexpected or unanticipated by the organization.⁴

It is important for the present discussion to note that this definition is designed to encompass both stimuli and responses.⁵ Defined in this manner, the concept is indeed theoretically significant, and has in fact become an important part of the literature on crisis decision-making. However, this definition of crisis is problematic. Certain shortcomings, stemming from the fact that it related to both stimuli and responses, will be discussed at some length later in the chapter.

In 1958, a group of scholars at Stanford Univer-

⁴C.F. Hermann, "Some Consequences of Crisis Which Limit the Viability of Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 8, 1963, p.14.

⁵Ibid., p. 65.

sity, directed by Robert C. North, began their work on crisis decision-making. Taking Snyder's approach, they focused on the assumption that interstate action is determined by the way the decision-makers perceive their environment. The problem was to study in some systematic manner the perceptions of these people. The Snyder and Paige study of the Korean situation, albeit done within a comprehensive conceptual framework, left something to be desired in terms of quantifiable and quantified variables. The Stanford group decided to utilize content analysis, which has been described as "a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication."⁶

To apply this technique to the study of crisis decision-making, they focused on the period in 1914 just prior to World War I. Their research on this crisis and the application of the same analytic techniques to other crises has yielded an abundant literature on crisis decision-making. O.R. Holsti, as a member of the Stanford group, has also contributed extensively to the literature on crisis decision-making. His approach to the 1914 situation and some of the hypotheses he derived and tested will

⁶B. Berelson, "Content Analysis," in G. Lindzey (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1954), p. 489. A fuller description of this analytic technique will be given in a later chapter.

will constitute the core of the rest of this discussion.

In several important ways, Holsti's work followed from both Snyder's approach and C.F. Hermann's approach to crises in organizations. Like Snyder, Holsti focuses on the decision-makers as the central actors. Utilizing Hermann's definition of crisis and his notion that crises create stress in organizations,⁷ Holsti developed testable hypotheses regarding the problem of the consequences of stress on decision-makers during a crisis situation.⁸ Unlike Hermann, Holsti narrowed his focus to the individual decision-maker. Thus, stress was conceptualized as an internal state of the decision-maker. This emphasis on intervening variables (internal states of individuals) can be traced to the Stanford researchers themselves. R.C. North, in suggesting the use of O.H. Mowrer's revised stimulus-response theory, for the study of crisis decision-making, stated the case as follows:

If at all applicable to international relations and the behavior of states, this basic hypothesis (that the level of affect shapes the individual's behavior) suggests that it is at least as important to study the intervening affect variable as it is to analyze

⁷C.F. Hermann, op., cit., pp. 66-82.

⁸O.R. Holsti, "Perceptions of Time, Perceptions of Alternatives and Patterns of Communication as Factors in Crisis Decision-Making," Peace Research Society Papers, 3, Chicago Conference, 1965, pp. 79-117.

the environmental stimuli or the record of decisions reached and actions taken. Indeed, it is precisely in the affect phases of the interaction system between two or more states that one would expect to find the pulsing dynamics of international behavior.⁹

Implicitly, Holsti appears to be utilizing a version of Mowrer's theory for his own analysis of crisis decision-making. The crisis situation itself is the stimulus, stress is the intervening variable, and altered perceptions of time and alternatives are among the responses to stress.¹⁰ Unfortunately, his use of Hermann's definition of crisis brings with it the problem of deciding if crisis is to be a stimulus, a response or both.¹¹ The ambiguity of the concept stems from the number and diversity of treatments it has received in the social psychological and political science literature. In order that the problems inherent in Holsti's usage of the concept can be emphasized, it is a worthwhile digression to review some meanings of the term "crisis" as it has been used in studying international relations and social-psychological phenomena.

For the purposes of the present discussion, the

⁹R.C. North, "Decision-making in Crisis: An Introduction," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 6, 1962, p. 199.

¹⁰Perceptions of time and alternatives will be discussed more fully later in this paper.

¹¹O.R. Holsti, op. cit., pp. 80-83.

definitions of crisis in the literature can be divided, tentatively, into those which define a crisis as an event or series of events occurring in the environment outside of the individual; into those definitions which treat crisis as a perceptual set within the individual and into those definitions which treat crisis as a stimulus and a perceptual event. For the sake of brevity the first type of definitions will be termed objective, the second type subjective, and the third, a mixture.

Miller and Iscoe, in their review of the concept of crisis, extract five common factors which seem to pertain to emotional crises.¹² The time factor, one of their five factors, appears to be an objective characteristic of crises.

There is agreement that it (crisis) is acute rather than chronic and ranges from very brief periods of time to longer periods which are not yet clearly defined. A special case is the treatment by Caplan in which the crisis situation exists from a minimum of about a week to maximum of six to eight weeks.¹³

Their second factor, marked changes of behavior, is a mixture of objective and subjective characteristics. Factors

¹²K. Miller and I. Iscoe, "The Concepts of Crisis: Current Status and Mental Health Implications," Human Organization, Vol. 22, 1963, p. 196.

¹³Ibid., p.196.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 196.

three, four and five--subjective aspects, relativistic aspects and organismic tension respectively--are more clearly subjective.¹⁴ In terms of a framework for the analysis of crisis decision-making, the inclusion of subjective and objective factors tends to confuse the status of the concept of crisis. Is it to be treated as a stimulus or as an internal reaction to a stimulus?

James Robinson, in his review of the literature, discusses several different approaches to the problem of defining a crisis--his emphasis being on the overly specific nature of some definitions (North's definition of crisis as a turning point) and the massiveness of others (Hermann Kahn's forty-four steps in an escalation to nuclear war). He sorts out three aspects of the concept which seem to recur in the literature. They are:

- (1) The identification of the origin of the event (whether external or internal to the decision-making unit) by the decision-makers. (2) The length of decision time available for response. (3) The relative importance to the participants of the values involved.¹⁵

Again, there seems to be a mixture of objective and subjective aspects in this definition of the concept. Later,

¹⁵J.A. Robinson, "Crisis," International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, p. 511.

in the same article, he takes C.F. Hermann to task for a problem he himself does not solve. Hermann, since he defines crisis at least partly in terms of decision time available, encounters the problem of psychological time versus clock time. Robinson states the problem in the following manner:

Decision time should not, therefore, be equated with clock time. There are two reasons for treating decision time differently. The first is that time has varying meanings and effects for different decision-makers. Owing to variations in cognitive capacity of decision-making styles, some individuals need a short amount of time to work on a task for which others require a longer period.¹⁶

The other reason is basically that the number of tasks per decision can vary so much that even a three-year period (the 1960-1963 period when Britain was negotiating entry into the European Common Market) can seem very short to the decision-makers involved.¹⁷

This last problem again revolves about the question of objective versus subjective characteristics of crises. In short, an objective definition of short decision time loses empirical import, and a subjective definition suffers from a lack of theoretical significance.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 512.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 512.

¹⁸C.F. Hermann, Crises in Foreign Policy (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1969).

C.F. Hermann, in a recent publication, has attempted to clearly define crisis and in so doing has been able to clarify substantially the status of the concept.¹⁸ Essentially all he does is re-state his three attributes of a crisis, but the manner in which he states them is, for the present discussion, very significant.

We have called attention to the interactive nature of the three crisis traits and to their appearance both in international situations and in other definitions of the concept. . . . (T)he proposed definition is formulated from the perspective of the decision-makers who experience the crisis; that is, the situation threatens their goals, it surprises them, and it is they who are faced with short decision time. In other words, a crisis is identified in terms of the policy makers' "definition of the situation". (Quoted from Snyder.) Defining crisis in this manner produces the relativistic aspects of the concept identified by Miller and Iscoe. Whereas the installation of rockets in Cuba by the Soviet Union was a crisis for American decision-makers as soon as the missiles were detected, the situation was not a crisis for the U.S.S.R. until the United States made its response.¹⁹

Hermann comes out unequivocally for a subjective definition of the concept of crisis. Thus, crisis is no longer an event in the environment, but a set of perceptions of an event in the environment.

Having clarified the status of the concept of crisis, it is possible to shed some light on the problems

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 33-34.

inherent in Holsti's usage of the term. Since he utilizes Hermann's unrevised definition of crisis, he encounters a definitional problem which makes his approach to crisis decision-making circular. If a crisis is defined in terms of perceived threat, the unexpectedness of the situation and short decision time, and if crisis "causes" stress, then to say that stress "causes" an enhanced awareness of time in decision-making is circular. One possible way out of this dilemma is to argue that psychological time (perceived time) is different from clock time. Robinson does, in fact, make this argument. Unfortunately, Holsti's hypotheses relating stress to alterations in the perceptions of time are too gross to make this distinction empirically. This can be seen by examining the wording of his hypotheses concerning time:

As stress increases in a crisis situation: (a) time will be perceived as an increasingly salient factor in decision-making. (b) Decision-makers will become increasingly concerned with the immediate rather than the distant future.²⁰

No apparent distinction is made between psychological time and clock time. In fact, Holsti seems to discover this

²⁰O.R. Holsti, op. cit., p. 366.

²¹Ibid., p. 366.

problem himself. In his original article, "Perceptions of Time, Perceptions of Alternatives, and Patterns of Communication as Factors in Crisis Decision-Making," he includes all three attributes of Hermann's definition of crisis, including short decision time. In a later version of the same article, "The 1914 Case" he introduces the concept of crisis implicitly as follows:

The independent variable in each hypothesis--the level of stress--can be defined as resulting from a perceived threat to high priority values.²¹

Noticeably, he has dropped short decision time and surprise as attributes of a crisis situation.

To summarize to this point, Holsti's approach to crisis decision-making, which can be traced from Snyder, Hermann and North, is not conceptually clear. Mowrer's S - r-s - R theory where r-s symbolizes affect experienced first as a response to an external stimulus and then as a drive, is a useful organizing device as long as the status of crisis decision-making concepts is reasonably clear.²² Because of the perceptual focus of the concept crisis, it is awkward to treat the term as a S in Mowrer's theory.

²²O.H. Mowrer, Learning Theory and Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), p. 77.

To solve the problem, it is necessary to create a framework for the study of crisis decision-making which "fits" the concepts used in social psychology and political science. Such a framework must be logically consistent and theoretically significant. Also, if it is to be at all testable, the concepts should have empirical import.

Margaret Hermann has suggested a model which is useful as a heuristic device in the development of an approach to crisis decision-making. Working with her husband, she utilized the data from the simulations he conducted in Project Michelson to test a model of psychological stress, which she developed from the work Lazurus has done in this area.²³ The following diagram illustrates the relationships among the concepts she utilizes.²⁴




FIGURE I. MODEL OF STRESS

²³R.S. Lazurus' principal work to date is: Psychological Stress and the Coping Process (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1966).

²⁴Margaret Hermann, "Testing a Model of Psychological Stress," Journal of Personality, Vol. 34, 1966, p. 382.

The numbers indicate the time sequence within the model. To utilize her approach for the present discussion it is necessary to re-label the model so that it can be used to develop a workable approach to the study of crisis decision-making.

Keeping in mind that the primary emphasis is to be placed on the testing of the relationship between stress and perceived time and alternatives, it is useful to think of the framework that is being developed in this discussion as an organizing device, which makes it easier to specify the relationships among crisis decision-making concepts. Given the status of the concepts of crisis and stress as internal factors involved in crisis decision-making, it is useful to use Mowrer's S - r-s - R theory in the present framework. Thus, the letters A, B, C and D locate the points at which the terms (S)timulus, (r)esponse, (s)timulus and (R)esponse, respectively, can be placed. The meanings of these terms can be outlined as follows:

Stimulus. Since the concept of crisis is defined in terms of perceptual variables, it is necessary to posit an antecedent, which can be defined independently of the decision-makers themselves. Thus, (A) will be defined as an interference with and/or blockage of some ongoing goal-oriented behavior or set of values of the decision-makers

on a low priority to high priority continuum. This definition is designed to coincide with the defining characteristics of crisis, which in the present model are conceptualized as responses to the stimulus. The foregoing definition appears to be theoretically significant inasmuch as international crises of a magnitude sufficient to threaten war incorporate attempts to block or deny the behavior or values of adversary nation-states. Stated differently, blockages of the kind outlined here are a necessary condition for a crises.

(r) esponse. (B) in this framework is the concept of crisis itself. Since the clearest statement of the status of this term to date has been Hermann's definition and since he defines the concept in perceptual terms, it is appropriate to utilize the term as the set of internal responses to the stimulus (A). Because of the circularity of using perceived time as a defining characteristic of crisis at the same time as it is being tested as a consequence of stress, only two of the three dimensions of crisis that Hermann uses are applicable. They are: (1) perceived threat to high priority values, (2) the perceived stimulus is an unexpected one to the decision-makers. Dropping perceived short decision time is an unavoidable consequence of attempting to clarify the concepts Holsti

uses. It can be argued that such a deletion undercuts the theoretical significance of the entire framework.

The appropriate rejoinder to this charge is that the loss of theoretical significance in terms of the applicability of the framework is probably regained by the added clarity of the present approach.

(s)timulus. Utilizing Mowrer's terminology, this phase in a S-R sequence can be conceptualized as drive. In terms of crisis decision-making, it is more appropriate to think of these drives as being affective states of the individual decision-makers. Examples of these drives would include fear, anxiety, and frustration. In her model, Hermann characterizes negative affect (which she defines in terms of anxiety, fear, frustration, hostility and tension) as a drive which motivates coping behavior (D).²⁵ O.R. Holsti, in his study of the 1914 crisis, uses the terms anxiety, affect, hostility and tension interchangeably with the term stress.²⁶ There would therefore seem to be solid grounds for thinking of stress as a drive in a crisis decision-making situation.

Since stress is treated as an independent variable

²⁵Margaret Hermann, op. cit., p. 382.

²⁶O.R. Holsti, op. cit., pp. 79-87.

in Holsti's study of the 1914 crisis, it is necessary to describe the empirical procedures that will be employed to measure the level of stress in the decision-makers over time. Because stress has been conceptualized as negative affect, the two indicators that Holsti uses are appropriate for our purposes.²⁷ To avoid an unnecessary limiting of the meaning of the concept of stress, a reduction sentence formulation of the two indicators will be used. Stated in reduction sentence form, his two indicators of stress are: (1) In a crisis situation, stress is increasing if and only if the mean intensity of perceptions of international hostility increases over time. (2) In a crisis situation, stress is increasing if and only if the mean intensity of violence of actions increases over time. Intensity of perceived hostility and violence of action are determined by scaling all perceptions of hostility and violence of actions during a given period (two weeks for example), utilizing the pair-comparison scaling technique.²⁸

The reduction sentence approach, although not

²⁷Ibid., pp. 88-89.

²⁸This scaling technique will be discussed more fully in the data analysis section of the thesis. A comprehensive reference is: North, Holsti, Zaninovich and Zinnes, Content Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern Press, 1963), pp. 79-89.

utilized extensively in the social sciences, has a number of advantages over the conventional operational definition form of the same indicators. Carl Hempel has stated the advantages as follows:

A reduction sentence offers no complete definition for the term it introduces (in this case, "stress", but only a partial, or conditional, determination of its meaning; it assigns meaning to the "new" term for its application to objects which satisfy specific test conditions.²⁹

In the present case, the two indicators of stress specify test conditions for the concept. Nothing is said about the meaning of the concept except in the test situations. Thus, the meaning of stress is only partially specified. This partial specification of meaning allows the researcher to add reduction sentence indicators as they suggest themselves in research on stress in crisis decision-making. Also, this entire approach allows the researcher to build a theory as he enhances the meaning of his concepts. Stress, as a concept, is strengthened as more indicators are added, and these are in fact related to each other empirically. Thus, an increase in intensity of perceptions of hostility over time should correlate with an increase in intensity of violence of actions. It should be noted that at least two indica-

²⁹Carl Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 26. The insert is mine.

tors are required for any one concept. In the present situation this is a logical requirement. Since the meaning of the concept of stress is specified only in terms of its reduction sentence indicators, an empirical test of one indicator necessitates making the other indicator the meaning convention of the concept itself.

Before proceeding with a discussion of the response phase of the framework, it is necessary to answer an extremely important question, albeit in a cursory manner. Was the situation leading up to the June War a stressful one for the Israeli decision-makers? There would seem to be preliminary evidence to suggest that for Levi Eshkol, the Prime Minister, and Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli Chief of Staff, at least, the situation was indeed stressful. Walter Lequeur, who has written a well-respected account of the crisis, speaks of Rabin as follows:

He had all the gifts of a great general but one: he was too sensitive to have that ultimate ruthlessness needed at a time of great stress. Exposed to civilian pressures, he began to waver at one decisive stage. He fell ill--according to the official version it was a case of nicotine poisoning. This was true, but not the whole truth: a deeper conflict had caused the breakdown.³⁰

An indication of the stress on Eshkol is given in the

³⁰Walter Lequeur, The Road to Jerusalem (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 117.

following account of a radio speech he gave on May 28:

Above all, the delivery was lamentable: Eshkol had apparently mislaid his glasses; he had to interrupt his speech several times; and there were interjections which would have spoiled even one of Churchill's great speeches.

A comment in a prominent Israeli daily newspaper the next day is telling:

The Prime Minister's speech last night was painful, perhaps he'll understand now that the burden is too heavy for him and he'll pass it on to someone else?³¹

These comments, unsubstantiated though they are, indicate that a deeper, more systematic study, of the kind in this paper, would be a worthwhile effort.

Returning to the task of defining the terms in the proposed model, there remains a discussion of (D), the response phase. Holsti has suggested three hypotheses which utilize stress as an independent variable. In the present study, two of these (the ones on the perceptions of time and perceptions of alternatives) will be tested.³²

³¹Ibid, p. 146.

³²O.R. Holsti, op. cit., p. 365.

There is an extensive body of literature on the effects of stress on problem solving, problem-solving rigidity, distortion of perceptions, distortion of time, etc. Only a few examples are necessary to illustrate the theoretical significance of Holsti's hypotheses. Horvath, in an extensive review of the literature on stress, emphasizes the general conclusion that stress seems to increase problem-solving rigidity. Individuals, when subjected to stressful situations, tend to fixate on solutions without searching for more economical alternatives.³³ Another general consequence of stress seems to be the narrowing of the focus of attention, both across time and space.³⁴ Postman and Bruner conclude that stress causes a breakdown in perceptual behavior, creating random and nonsensical responses.³⁵ Cohen and Mezey, in a study of the effects of anxiety on perception of time, conclude that anxiety distorts

³³F.E. Horvath, "Psychological Stress: A Review of Definitions and Experimental Research," General Systems Yearbook, 4 (1959), 220.

³⁴Ibid., p. 224.

³⁵L. Postman and J. Bruner, "Perceptions Under Stress," Psychological Review, 55 (1948), p. 323.

estimates of clock time.³⁶ Holsti summarized the behavioral consequences of stress as follows:

. . . deterioration of verbal performance; increased rate of error; stereotyped performances; disorganized activity; problem-solving rigidity; diminished tolerance for ambiguity; and a reduction in the focus of attention, both across time and across space. While some of the experimental studies concerning stress have been criticized on both conceptual and methodological grounds, the general conclusion that high stress is dysfunctional across a wide spectrum of types of behavior, including the effective search for solutions to problems, appears unassailable.³⁷

The hypotheses which will be tested are: As stress increases in a crisis situation (1) time will be perceived as an increasingly salient factor in decision-making. (2) Decision-makers will become increasingly concerned with the immediate rather than the distant future. (3) The perceived range of alternatives open to themselves will become narrower. (4) The perceived range of alternatives open to adversaries will broaden.³⁸

Although it is not crucial to the main thrust of the analytic framework being developed here, given the emphasis on the relationship between stress and perceived

³⁶S.I. Cohen and A.G. Mezey, "The Effect of Anxiety on Time Judgement and Time Experience in Normal Persons," Journal of Neurological and Neurosurgical Psychiatry, 24 (1961), p. 268.

³⁷O.R. Holsti, op. cit., p. 82.

³⁸O.R. Holsti, op. cit., p. 365.

time and alternatives and given the fact that Mowrer's S - R-s - R theory is being utilized, there is value in discussing the concept of motivation vis a vis this framework for the analysis of crisis decision-making. In terms of the literature on motivation in decision-making, there would seem to be grounds for making a distinction between motivation due to an affective state of an individual (in the present situation, stress) and motivation due to the shared value orientations of the decision-makers. In his study of the Korean Crisis, Snyder stated propositions about motivation which can be related to the present study:

Motivation. Specific proposition no. 1: Initial evaluation of the seriousness of the event resulted in the imputation of a high degree of requiredness (necessity of making a decision) to the solution.

Specific proposition no. 3: There was a will to act among the decision-makers, and there were means at hand to make a positive response possible.

Specific proposition no. 12: Differences among the decision-makers with respect to relative ordering of values and situational relevancies did not prevent, or alter in any basic way, the the sequential definitions of the situation (the increasing magnitude of the crisis) because such differences did not have to be reconciled and were completely overshadowed by the cruciability of shared orientations.³⁹

³⁹R.C. Snyder and G. Paige, "The United States Decision To Resist Agression in Korea: The Application of an Analytical Scheme," in J.N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1961), p. 196. The emphasis is mine.

Essentially Snyder is assuming that all the crucial decision-makers were highly motivated by a common core of values. In the present situation, given the ex post facto nature of the present analysis, and given the fact that it, too, appears to be a crisis situation, the assumption that the crucial⁴⁰ Israeli decision-makers were all highly motivated is not unreasonable.

In conclusion, it is necessary to emphasize that the model presented in this chapter is not meant as a final answer. It is simply an attempt to clarify the concepts and the relationships among concepts used in the literature on crisis decision-making. As has been noted, O.R. Holsti's approach, although theoretically significant, is conceptually confused. To rectify this, it was necessary to delete perceived time as a characteristic of crisis. This deletion does reduce the theoretical significance of the model inasmuch as there is a great deal of literature which suggests that time pressure actually creates stress. Holsti himself appears to recog-

⁴⁰Operationalizing the word "crucial" will involve using a four-stage process which has been utilized by W. Vanderelst, "An Analysis of Crisis Decision-Making: The Spanish American War Case, 1898." Unpublished Master's thesis, McMaster University, 1969. This process will be described more fully in a later chapter.

nize the two-way interaction between stress and time.⁴¹ There may indeed be an empirically verifiable interaction, but until the problem of measuring the difference between the effects of clock time and the subjective interpretation of time on decision-makers is resolved empirically, we are forced to choose between defining crisis in terms of perceived time or testing the relationship between stress and perceived time.

In the present model, crisis has been defined as a perceptual event. This definition has the advantage of being able to diagnose specific situation as they are perceived by the decision-makers, to see if they are in fact crises. A major disadvantage of such a definition is that it forces the investigator to conduct his analyses on an ex post facto basis. What is needed, therefore, is a reliable definition of crisis which can be employed by the investigator without having to delve into the perceptions of the decision-makers involved. At present, no such definition exists. Indeed, if one could be found, it would constitute a major breakthrough, since it would encourage the formulation of laws which the social scientist could use to predict crises, instead of simply predicting the consequences of crises.

⁴¹O.R. Holsti, op. cit., p. 82.

Since one of the foci of this discussion has been theoretically significant, it is appropriate to end by underscoring the importance of perceived time and alternatives in decision-making. Herbert Simon has stated a principle which is widely utilized in organizational theory:

. . . the principle of bounded rationality: The capacity of the human mind for fomulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world--or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective reality.⁴²

A corollary to this principle might be that if a crisis foreign policy decision is to be a relatively "rational" one, it is necessary to avoid narrowing one's alternatives and it is necessary to avoid perceiving that one's decision time is running short. This prescription (it does appear to be evaluative in nature) is borne out empirically in at least one case to date--the Cuban missile crisis. Holsti credits Kennedy with avoiding war by keeping several alternatives open and attempting to lengthen the decision time.⁴³ In the case at hand, the most interesting question is therefore whether the Israeli decision-makers failed to do this. An attempt to answer this question is one of the aims of the present study.

⁴²Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957), p. 198.

⁴³O.R. Holsti, op. cit., p. 377.

CHAPTER II

Introduction

A social psychological framework for an analysis of the crisis aspects of the period prior to the war has been outlined. It is now necessary to widen the scope of the discussion by including an examination of the train of events that culminated in the June War.

The present emphasis on events is appropriate for two reasons. First, events can be used to create an outline of the major happenings in the Middle East during the months prior to the conflict. Such an outline is useful because it simplifies the problem of interpreting the results of the data analysis to be conducted in Chapters Three and Four. A useful analogy is to think of the events as the skeleton of this study and the quantitative analysis as the flesh to be placed on the skeleton. The second use of events in this study is as data for the verification or denial of the appropriateness of a subordinate systems approach to the interactions of the key nations in the 1967 conflict. Essentially, events will be used to answer this question:

Did the key actors in the 1967 War (Israel, Jordan, Syria, and the United Arab Republic) behave as members of a Middle East subordinate system in the months prior to the Six Day War?¹

Chronology

Before one can set out a chronology of events, it is necessary to choose a relevant beginning date as a starting point. In any discussion of the events which culminated in the Six Day War, as Walter Lequeur suggests, the choice of a starting point is inevitably somewhat arbitrary.²

¹Michael Brecher, in a discussion of the 1967 War, refers to these four nations as the key actors. See: Michael Brecher, "The Middle East Subordinate System and Its Impact on Israel's Foreign Policy," 13 (1969), p. 118. The concept of a subordinate system will be discussed at some length in this chapter.

²Walter Lequeur, The Road to Jerusalem (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), p.3. His description of the problem bears repeating. "Lastly, there is the crucial question, when and where to start. History is a seamless web; the decision to choose a starting point is always arbitrary. A good case could be made to begin on May 15, when the news about the Egyptian troop concentrations reached Jerusalem. But an equally good case can be made in favor of April 7 (the air battle between Israel and Syria) of the Israeli retaliatory raid at Samu in Jordan, in November 1966. . . . There would, however, be no Israeli raids but for the activities of the Arab guerrilla units and of the Syrian government which gave them full support. If so, January 1965 (when the Syrian-based guerrillas began their forays into Israel) or February 1966 (when the Ba'th government came to power in Syria) provide a logical starting point. On the other hand, it can be persuasively argued that the escalation in 1967 was the direct sequel to the Suez War in 1956, or, indeed, to 1948, the establishment of the Jewish state and the military intervention of the Arab armies. 1956 and 1948 in their turn were merely the culmination of the historical processes that had begun long before."

Fortunately, in this case, there is some assistance from the work that Robert Burrowes and Bert Spector have done with the principal actors in the 1967 War.³ Their work to date, consisting of an enumerative profile of the interactions initiated by Jordan, Syria, and the United Arab Republic towards Israel, gives the researcher an opportunity to choose a starting point which can be supported empirically. The following graph, taken from their work, illustrates the Arab-Israeli conflict from the Arab perspective from September 1966 to May 1967.⁴ The graph itself suggests three starting points. They are (1) the month of November, during which hostilities by all three Arab nations were at a local maximum vis a vis Israel, (2) the month of January, during which Syrian hostilities were very high, and (3) the month

³Robert Burrowes with Bert Spector, "Conflict and Cooperation Within and Among Nations: Enumerative Profiles of Syria, Jordan, and the United Arab Republic, January 1965 to May 1967". Paper presented at the International Studies Association, Pittsburgh, April 2-4, 1970.

⁴This graph is derived from an unweighted sum of all hostile interactions initiated by Israel's three principal Arab neighbors. Hostile interactions are defined in terms of the five external conflict categories Burrowes and Spector have set up. These are: (1) number of informal protests or accusations, (2) number of informal warnings or threats, (3) number of formal diplomatic protests or warnings, (4) number of negative sanctions and minor unfriendly acts, and (5) number of military actions. These categories are explained in the appendix to R. Burrowes with B. Spector, "The Strength and Direction of Relationships Between Domestic and External Conflict and Cooperation: Syria, 1961-1967". Paper presented to the 65th meeting of The American Political Science Association, New York, September 2-6, 1969.




FIGURE 2. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

of March, during which Arab hostilities were very low. The choice of a starting point is, to a great extent, dictated by the focus of the study that is being undertaken. In the present case, because the emphasis is being placed on interactive and crisis aspects of the Arab-Israeli situation during the pre-war months of 1967, January will be the starting point for a chronology of events. This point allows the researcher to capture the intense Syrian hostilities that dominated the Arab-Israeli relations during January and part of February. It also includes the pronounced lull in hostilities that characterized the months of February and March.⁵ Finally, this point includes the two-month period of hostilities in April and May that culminated in the war itself. By beginning in January, it may be

⁵This lull is one of the two most striking features Burrowes and Spector seem to have found in the analysis of their data (the other being the low level of U.A.R.-Israeli conflict). The patterns of conflict, which are graphed in Figure 2, are indeed intriguing, but as the authors remark: "Our attempt to map the patterns that seem certain to play major parts in an explanation of the Six Day War is marred by the absence of data on a principal actor: Israel. Israel was not a passive or innocent bystander in the months prior to May 1967. An attempt to explain cannot begin seriously until the Israeli data is collected. In the absence of that data, Israel is only a target of the actions and reactions of others. She neither acts nor reacts." One of the aims of the present thesis is to provide the missing data, at least for the final months prior to the war. Thus, Israel will become the initiator of actions, instead of being merely the recipient.

possible to uncover roots of the conflict which might be obscured by an analysis involving a shorter time span. In short, an interaction analysis of the five months prior to the war may be very useful in explaining the final escalation during April and May.

Before beginning the description of events, a final point needs clarification. Since Israeli actions and the perceptions of her leaders constitute the primary focus of this study, events will be described from the Israeli point of view. This need not imply a pro-Israeli bias. In fact, because Israel launched the pre-emptive strike that started the Six Day War, it is important to study the perceptions and actions of that nation. Also, because perceptual data is relatively abundant from Israel, one can achieve more significant insights into the dynamics of Middle Eastern perceptions by studying the Israeli point of view. Finally, because Israel's existence is the fundamental reason for a continuing Middle East conflict, that nation is undoubtedly the central actor in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, to study Israel's point of view is to penetrate to the core of the Middle East situation.

As the Burrowes and Spector data show, January 1967 began with the Syrian guerrillas intensifying their activities against Israel. In addition, the Syrian army

stepped up its activities as well. The guerrillas tended to concentrate on mine-laying types of actions, whereas the Syrian regulars concentrated on daytime harrassment of Israeli kibbutzim along the border. In the January 1 to January 12 period, at least ten separate incidents had occurred. On that day (January 12), the Israeli Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol, warned the Syrians that "Israel will respond to force with force, but the time, the place, and the weapons will be of our own choosing."⁶ On January 14, an anti-personnel mine that had been buried along the edge of a soccer field at Dishon killed an eighteen-year-old youth.⁷ This incident increased the rancor of the Israeli leaders. A series of letters were dispatched to the United Nations Security Council, stressing the gravity of the situation. A passage from the letter sent as a result of the Dishon incident serves to illustrate how the Israeli government viewed the situation.

The four attacks, mentioned above (referring to recent incidents), are the culmination of more than two weeks of unrestrained Syrian aggression along the border of and inside Israel. The crimes committed yesterday at the village of Dishon are of the same pattern as previous mining and sabotage activities by Syria. The use of a nefarious stratagem in order to inflict death and injury resembles the attack near the village of Shaar Hag Golan, as reported to the Security Council in a letter of 10 October, 1966 S/7536, which was the subject of a debate in the Security Council.⁸

⁶The Jerusalem Post, January 12, p. 1.

⁷Ibid., January 15, p. 1.

⁸United Nations Document S/7684, January 16, 1967.

In effect, the same pattern of raid after raid that led to the Israeli reprisal raid against the Jordanian border village of Samu was being repeated. This time, however, the Syrian government agreed to discuss the situation at a series of Mixed Armistice Commission meetings (M.A.C.) with Israel. On Wednesday, January 25, the talks began. The resumption of the M.A.C. talks coincided with the reduction of hostilities along the Syrian-Israeli border. In fact, this point marked the beginning of the two-month lull the Burrowes and Spector data illustrated (see Figure 2).

On the domestic front, the Israeli government was faced with a deepening economic recession as 1967 began. Unemployment had reached 10 percent of the civilian labor force by the end of 1966, and was continuing to worsen.⁹ Yigal Allon, the Minister of Labor, reported on February 23 that the situation would likely get worse as university students finished and as army draftees were discharged in the spring. When analysts turned to the question of what was causing the recession, the consensus of opinions was that Israelis were paying for the increasing standard of living they had enjoyed for a decade.

⁹The Jerusalem Post Weekend Magazine, March 17, p. 7.

One analyst pointed to two major sources of concern for Israeli policy-makers. They were (1) the fact that consumption constantly exceeded production and (2) the chronic trade deficit.¹⁰ These problems were reflected in the International Labor Organization Yearbook statistics which reported that Israel had experienced the steepest price increase of any nation in the world during the 1955-1965 period, an increase of 73.3 percent.¹¹ These figures reflect the effect of increased consumer demand which could not be satisfied by existing domestically produced goods and services.

The period of retrenchment was not easy for the Israeli economy. Aside from the unemployment problem, wage increases continued to outstrip productivity substantially. During the nine-month period from April 1966 to January 1967, output in terms of Israeli pounds increased by five percent, whereas wages increased by fifteen percent.¹²

As with most economic problems, the causes were

¹⁰Ibid., January 27, p. 5.

¹¹The Jerusalem Post, January 11, p. 11.

¹²The Jerusalem Post Weekend Magazine, January 20, p. 3.

easily identified, but disagreements arose over the means necessary to solve them. The government's approach was outlined by Eshkol on February 6:

We have to raise our productivity, double our output, and treble our exports. That is the object of the new economic policy that my government has initiated. Present unemployment is the symptom of the changing face of the economy as it moves from a domestic to an export orientation. The economic slowdown was precipitated by a fall in immigration (the provision of goods and services for immigrants was no longer a necessary component of the Israeli economic orientation). Our response was immediate and in some ways radical. The target is economic self-sufficiency. When immigration starts again, and we hope that it will be very soon, we must be ready with a modern and fully developed economy.¹³

There was evidence that the government was, in fact, succeeding. Industrial exports, for example, increased by 4.8 percent in the first half of 1966, by 18.5 percent in the third quarter, and by 27.6 percent in the final quarter.¹⁴ The cost of living index, which had been increasing steadily all through the previous decade, dropped for two successive months in January and February of 1967.¹⁵ But the coalition's approach was not acceptable to everyone.¹⁶

¹³The Jerusalem Post, February 7, p. 2.

¹⁴Ibid., January 3, p. 1.

¹⁵Ibid., March 7, p. 6.

¹⁶The governing coalition consisted of five parties, among them the Mapam, who organized the rally. Others in the government included the Labor Alignment bloc (Mapai and Ahdut Ha'avoda Parties), the National Religious Party, the Independent Liberals, and the Poale Agudat Israel. (Source: The Israel Government Yearbook, 1966-1967, Israeli Government Printing Office, p. 18.)

On March 14, a rally of 7,000 people organized by the Mapam Party to protest unemployment turned into a riot in which twenty people were injured.¹⁷ Two days later, the two major right-wing opposition parties, Gahal and Rafi, submitted non-confidence motions against the government, based on its handling of unemployment and the stalemated M.A.C. talks with Syria.¹⁸ These motions were defeated on a straight coalition--opposition vote, but for the first time in Israel's nineteen-year parliamentary history, the entire opposition had voted together.¹⁹

Thus, as March ended, the Israeli government was faced with the prospect of continued opposition to an unpopular domestic policy which was designed to stabilize and strengthen the economy. However, and this could be

¹⁷The Jerusalem Post, March 15, p. 1.

¹⁸The M.A.C. talks had broken down after three meetings because Israel had insisted on sticking to the original agenda, whereas the Syrians wanted to broaden the talks to include more issues.

¹⁹The Jerusalem Post, March 17, p.1.

cited as an example of the interdependence of the Middle East core nations,²⁰ Israel's domestic problems were soon to be overshadowed by the increased pressure on her borders.

Border skirmishes with Syrian and Jordanian troops had continued intermittently during the two-month lull described previously. But as March ended the conflicts intensified. On March 16, for example, Israeli troops intercepted guerrillas and forced them to flee to Jordan. This time, however, helicopters followed them into Jordan, and Israeli soldiers were disembarked to attack the guerrillas there.²¹ No longer (apparently) were the borders to be considered as sanctuaries for raiders. On April 7, what began as a tank skirmish turned into a major confrontation with Syria, with the Israeli Air Force shooting down six Syrian jet fighters. In fact, the Israeli jets pursued the Syrian planes as far as Damascus. A new dimension was added to the situation on April 8, when the Jordanian newspaper Al Quds ran an article headlined "What Steps Has Cairo Taken?" The editor pointed out

²⁰The question of the degree of interdependence of the main actors in the 1967 War will be discussed at length in the subordinate systems section of this chapter.

²¹Ibid., p. 1.

that Egypt had been fighting Arabs in Yemen, but did not seem to have time to defend Arabs from Zionists. Nasser was accused of hiding behind the U.N. forces in the Sinai from where it was safe to accuse Jordan of collusion with the Israelis.²² Beginning on April 10 with the visit of Egypt's Air Force Commander, Mohammed Mahmoud, to Syria, Egypt participated in a series of meetings with Syria, including meetings in May to exchange intelligence information on reported Israeli troop concentrations along the Syrian border. Whether Israel was in fact planning to attack Syria is an issue which is still debated by those who have studied the crisis. It is true that no substantial troop concentrations existed along the Syrian border during the supposed invasion period,²³ but it is also true that Israeli officials made statements which could well have been construed as threats. The most interesting of these was a statement attributed either to

²²J. Bower Bell, The Long War (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 404.

²³The absence of Israeli troop concentration during the period that Syria accused Israel of intending to invade was confirmed by the Secretary General in his report to the Security Council on May 19, 1967: "There have been in the past few days persistent reports about troop movements and concentrations, particularly on the Israel side of the Syrian border. These have caused anxiety and at times excitement. The government of Israel very recently has assured me that there are no unusual Israel troop concentrations or movements along the Syrian line, that there will be none, and that no military action will be initiated by the armed forces of Israel unless such an action is first taken by the

Yitzhak Rabin, the Chief of Staff, or one of his immediate subordinates. According to one account, Rabin stated on May 10 that it might be necessary to attack Damascus and topple the regime of President Atassi.²⁴ Unfortunately, different accounts of the same statement place its date on May 11 or May 12,²⁵ and some sources deny that the statement was ever made.²⁶ On balance, the evidence points to the existence of such a statement, although its text has never been traced.²⁷

On May 15, Israel held its Independence Day

other side. Reports from UNTSO observers have confirmed the absence of troop concentrations and significant troop movements on both sides of the line." Quoted in: Theodore Draper, Israel and World Politics (New York: The Viking Press, 1968), p. 162.

²⁴R.S. Churchill and W.S. Churchill, The Six Day War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), p. 29.

²⁵For the May 11 version see: Maxime Robinson, Israel and the Arabs, transl. Michael Perl (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968), p. 186.

²⁶For a denial of such a statement's existence see: J.B. Bell, op. cit., p. 406.

²⁷Ann Williams, "The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, " International Affairs, 45 (1969), p. 282.

celebrations in Jerusalem, limiting the arms displayed in the military parade to those allowed by the Israeli-Jordanian armistice agreement. Nevertheless, many foreign diplomats boycotted the parade because it was being held in the international city. On the same day, Egyptian troops and armour began moving into the Sinai Desert, along Israel's southern border.²⁸

Until May 15, the threats and counterthreats had been primarily verbal (notwithstanding the continuous guerrilla activities along the Syrian and Jordanian borders.) But now that Egyptian troops and tanks were involved, the situation was new and potentially more serious. To counter the Egyptian moves, a partial mobilization was ordered by the Israeli government on May 15. On May 16, the Egyptian Chief of Staff, General Fawzi, asked the UNEF commander to evacuate the positions along the Israeli border. By May 18, U Thant had complied with the Egyptian demand and the Egyptians had occupied the U.N. positions along the Israeli border and at Sharm-a-Sheikh on the Straits of Tiran. On May 19, the Israeli government ordered a complete mobilization of all reserves. Militarily, the two major actors had committed their

²⁸W. Lequeur, op. cit., p. 76.

forces and now the waiting began.²⁹ On the political front, a very complicated, and, indeed, world-wide battle was about to begin.

From the perspective of Israel's governing coalition, the events from May 15 onward tended to exacerbate the existing political situation. Once the gravity of the situation was appreciated, a rift developed which roughly paralleled the alignment of parties over the March non-confidence motions. On the one hand, the Rafi Party, led by Simon Peres, Moshe Dayan, and David Ben-Gurion, and the Gahal bloc led by Menachem Begin, pressed for action. The Israeli military staff, including Rabin, also wanted to engage the Arab nations as soon as possible. Their justification for immediate action rested on the belief that the Arab nations were planning a general war to defeat Israel completely. If this was to be prevented, it was necessary for Israel to strike first.³⁰ On the other hand, Eshkol and his coalition cabinet tended to weigh other factors as heavily as the Arab threat. These included the effects of a pre-emptive

²⁹It is true that from May 19, the Israeli and Egyptian armies were arrayed against each other. But on the other fronts, mobilizations, troop, air force, and financial commitments were being made by the peripheral Arab states to the core Arab nations surrounding Israel.

³⁰W. Lequeur, op. cit., pp. 123-125.

strike on world public opinion, and the possibility of great power intervention.

The closing of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping on May 23 served further to aggravate the political situation. Eshkol viewed this move as an act of aggression in itself,³¹ but his cabinet was still undecided. It was agreed to send Abba Eban to the Western capitals in the hope that Western diplomatic pressure could induce Nasser to reopen the Straits to Israeli shipping. Eban returned to Israel on May 27, but his report did not settle the issue. The cabinet vote that night on the question of initiating a pre-emptive war was split, nine for and nine against.³²

By this date, however, the political situation was changing as a result of Eshkol's consultations with the opposition leaders. On May 23, members of the Gahal and Rafi were invited to Tel Aviv to discuss the situation with Eshkol.³³ That same day, the idea of broadening the government was first suggested in conversations

³¹J.B. Bell, op. cit., p. 409.

³²W. Lequeur, op. cit., p. 142.

³³The Jerusalem Post, May 24, p. 1.

among the party leaders.³⁴ In eight days, the pressure to widen the coalition had increased to a point where both Eshkol's and Golda Meier's objections to such a move were overcome. On June 1, it was decided at a Mapai Party caucus to include Gahal and Rafi in the government. Moshe Dayan replaced Eshkol as Defense Minister, and Menachem Begin and Joseph Saphir of the Gahal bloc were included in the cabinet as Ministers Without Portfolio. On the Arab side, the ranks had also closed--on May 30, King Hussein had flown to Cairo, where he signed a mutual defense pact with Nasser.

The summary of events from May 15 onwards has been of necessity sketchy, partly because a full description would take a great deal of space, but largely because it would involve even more interpretation of the significance of events, a subjective factor which this description has attempted to minimize. The movement to create a broader government was complex and not easily explained either in terms of "dove" versus "hawk" or right versus left. Walter Lequeur describes the movement in these terms:

³⁴W. Lequeur, op. cit., p. 127.

The movement for a national government was contradictory in character: partly it was born out of a sincere belief that in that hour of crisis all party differences should be forgotten and that the best men in the country should form a new government irrespective of party affiliation and past quarrels; partly it was the result of a sudden wave of emotion, which, though short of a panic or mass hysteria, was certainly deeply irrational, reflecting a mystical belief that only the victor of Sinai could save Israel.³⁵

The exact time at which the decision to go to war was made is not yet an established fact. The general consensus was that the Nasser-Hussein pact had decided the issue for Israel. If a formal decision was made, it was made during the evening of June 3 and the morning of June 4.³⁶ Plans were finalized and the decision was made to launch the attack on Monday, June 5.

Subordinate System Approach

In terms of the foregoing events, a pattern of escalation, hence interaction, emerges. On the political dimension, at least, a case for treating the Middle East as a subordinate system can be made. An example of evidence for this would be the fact that none of the Great Powers had enough influence on the Middle East actors to prevent the June War. Before this can be tested syste-

³⁵Ibid., p. 151.

³⁶Ibid., p. 155.

matically, it is necessary to clarify the concept of a subordinate system and discuss its empirical interpretations in international relations literature.

The interest in the Middle East as a subordinate system extends as far back as 1958, when Leonard Binder attempted to deal with the Arab nations in these terms. His approach was essentially an attempt to point out that the global bipolar system did not and could not explain the actions of nations in regions like the Middle East.³⁷ In essence, he pointed out that the state of mutual deterrence that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union gave the smaller powers freedom of action in their regional international relations. His analysis of the Middle East involved geographic, cultural, social, historical, and political dimensions,³⁸ and on the basis of this analysis, he concluded that the Middle East was indeed a subordinate international system. His discussion of the implications of this conclusion is relevant for the present study:

It is far more likely that the Middle Eastern states will feel compelled to act in terms of their own complex system so as to preserve their individual

³⁷ Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," World Politics, 10 (1957-1958), p. 409.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 416-418.

positions within the Middle East structure and that they may feel that mutual deterrence is a condition which exists independently of their own action, i.e., that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. will, in the last analysis, not react to moves of third parties in the Middle East if such action would entail a global nuclear war.³⁹

After Binder's effort, little was done with the concept until the mid-sixties. By this time, several other groups of nations had emerged as regions which could be analyzed in terms of the subordinate system concept.⁴⁰ As interest in the concept grew, an effort was made to give it a fuller, empirically testable, meaning. Bruce M. Russett, using sociocultural data, U.N. voting behavior, membership in regional and international organizations, trading patterns, and geographic criteria, clustered nations into international regions. He concluded that the Middle East, which he defined in terms of the Arab nations, was one of the "clusters of states that agree substantially over two or three criteria, but fall within a much larger grouping with poor internal differentiation, for the others."⁴¹

³⁹Ibid., p. 427.

⁴⁰Example of these regions include: the South African region, the West European region, the South East Asian region, and the West African region.

⁴¹Bruce M. Russett, International Regions and the International System (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1967), pp. 182-183.

Cantori and Spiegel, using a different approach that was equally as comprehensive, ranked five international regions including the Middle East in terms of their cohesiveness, communications, power, and structure of relations (basically a cooperation-conflict continuum).⁴² On most dimensions, the Middle East ranked third out of five regions compared.⁴³

In terms of these two studies, the evidence for the existence of a Middle East subordinate system is mixed. It is noteworthy that neither study included Israel as a core actor. Russett confined the Middle East to the Arab-speaking nations, and Cantori and Spiegel defined the Middle East core in terms of the United Arab Republic, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Jordan, Syria, South Yemen, and the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms.⁴⁴ But this approach tends to underplay the fact that a certain percentage of Arab interactions are conditioned by the conflict that exists

⁴²Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel, "International Regions: A Comparative Approach to Five Subordinate Systems," International Studies Quarterly, 13 (1969), pp. 362-363.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 363-379.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 364.

between Israel and her Arab neighbors.⁴⁵ In this sense, Israel would seem to be a member of a Middle East subordinate system.

Before arguing for the inclusion of Israel in a Middle East subordinate system, it is helpful to summarize the discussion to this point. This summary places the final argument in the context of the development of the concept itself.

Binder's major point was that the interactions of nation states in certain geographic regions like the Middle East would be better analyzed by creating a level of analysis between the nation-state level and the global level. Thus, he introduced the concept of a subordinate international system. His discussion of the parameters for such a system (at least in terms of the Middle East) included cultural, social, historical, geographic, and political dimensions, but were not outlined in any precise manner. Russett approached Binder's level of analysis

⁴⁵Two examples of this pattern (both on the political dimension) can be drawn from the five month period being studies in this thesis. When Israeli jets shot down the Syrian MiG fighters during the April 7 battle, three crashed into Jordan. The Jordanian government made public the fact that the Syrian jets had been equipped with dummy air to air missiles. This angered the Syrian leaders considerably. The other example, stemming from the same battle, was the article published in the Jordanian newspaper Al Quds on April 8, in which Nasser was accused of ignoring his obligations under the Syro-Egyptian defense pact. On April 10, Egypt sent her Air Force commander to Damascus for a series of talks.

empirically. His research focused on the concept of an international region which he defined operationally in sociocultural, political, economic, and geographic terms. Unlike Binder, Russett concluded that the Middle East did not constitute a comprehensive international region. Cantori and Spiegel utilized a different version of the concept of an international region and also showed that the Middle East was not a comprehensive region. Given this evidence, is it realistic to assume that there is a Middle East subordinate system, and, if there is, that Israel is a member of it?

Michael Brecher answers these questions by pointing out that twenty years of conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbours cannot but have influenced the development of a Middle East subordinate system.⁴⁶ In fact, since the Israeli perspective is to be the focus of the present study, the corollary he presents to this assertion is even more important:

At the close of two decades, Israel was clearly the strongest power in the Near East Core of the Middle East Subordinate System; and her policies, foreign and military, had been shaped throughout by the persistent conflict with her Arab neighbours.⁴⁷

Brecher argues that because of the twenty years

⁴⁶Michael Brecher, op. cit., p. 119.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 139.

of Arab-Israeli hostilities, Israel is indeed an integral part of the Middle East core, along with the United Arab Republic, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. Thus, if one wishes to trace the sources of Israeli foreign policy, one must include a study of her interactions with her Arab neighbours. In this study the parameters of the subordinate system Brecher outlines will be interpreted empirically, so that his assertions about a Middle East subordinate system and Israel's place in that system can be tested systematically. Briefly stated, his six parameters are:

- (1) Delimited scope, with primary stress on a geographic region;
- (2) at least three actors;
- (3) objective recognition by most other actors as constituting a distinctive community, region, or segment of the global system;
- (4) self-identification as such;
- (5) units of power relatively inferior to units in the dominant system, using a sliding scale of power for both; and
- (6) more intensive and influential penetration of the subordinate system by the dominant system than the reverse.⁴⁸

In the present study, given the five month period that will be analyzed, five of the six parameters can

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 117.

be treated as constants. Geography, the number of actors, the relative power of the Middle East vis a vis the global system, the direction of the penetration, and the recognition by other actors that the Middle East was a distinctive unit were all relatively constant across the period January to May, 1967. The fourth parameter, on the other hand, could have varied significantly during this period. In fact, degree of self-identification might well have varied from issue area to issue area. This parameter, therefore, merits an empirical interpretation that will allow the researcher to study the degree of self-identification over time.

In the present study, the degree of self-identification will be operationalized in terms of the Burrowes and Spector interaction approach to the study of inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli interactions in the months prior to the Six Day War. Since their data makes Israel the recipient of interactions, it is necessary to provide the data to make Israel an initiator of actions as well. By quantifying Arab-Israeli relations in this manner, it is possible to answer the question that was posed in the introduction to this chapter: did the key actors in the 1967 conflict behave as members of a subordinate system during the

months prior to the war itself?⁴⁹ If the answer is 'yes' (this will be determined by measuring the relative importance of the other Middle East core nations to each of the four core actors, in terms of their interactions), then the researcher seeking explanations for the 1967 crisis can narrow his focus to the Middle East itself. This obviously simplifies the research task, without excluding significant sources of explanation for the war itself.

⁴⁹This question is doubly interesting because Burrowes and Spector were not convinced that a Middle East subordinate system existed, at least in terms of their analysis of the interactions of the United Arab Republic, Jordan, and Syria with each other, with Israel, and with the global system. They conclude their discussion of the problem with these remarks: "If all or part of the Middle East does constitute a subsystem, it is one that is deeply penetrated by a small number of the most highly-developed nations of the world." Burrowes with Spector, op. cit., p. 18.

CHAPTER III

THE INTERACTIVE ASPECTS OF THE FIVE-MONTH PERIOD PRIOR TO THE JUNE WAR

Introduction

This chapter consists of an application of the Burrowes and Spector event data approach to the January through May period in 1967. Essentially, data will be brought to bear on the question raised in Chapter II: Did the key actors in the 1967 conflict behave as members of a subordinate system during the months prior to the War itself? After the question has been answered, the patterns of interaction among Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Isreal will be examined across the five months prior to the War.

This chapter will be divided into three sections. The first will consist of a discussion of the methodological aspects of event data analysis. The second section will focus on the issue of treating Isreal as a member of a Middle East subordinate system. Finally, the patterns of conflict among the four members of the Middle East core will be examined during the period prior

to the June War.

Methodology of Event Data Analysis

When used as sources of data, events as reported in newspapers, chronologies, and journals are not without their problems. Burrowes and Spector, from whom the author has adopted most of his methods, characterize the advantages and disadvantages of event data in the following manner:

Ready accessibility seems to be the most distinctive characteristic of most event data. The person using event data is prepared to sacrifice other qualities--for example, greater reliability and sensitivity--for accessibility. Event data, relative to other kinds of data, represents savings in time and money. They create a situation in which it is possible to test "hunches" with some freedom. And the physical ability to play rigorously with hunches seems to have an important role in the early stages of a scientific discipline.¹

To mention only the major ones, more mundane issues include the problem of consistency within and between sources, the problem of varying degrees of completeness in reporting events within and between sources, and the problem of coding and categorizing events in a useful manner.

Since the author's concern was to collect and code events making Israel the actor, the sheer volume

¹Burrowes and Spector, op. cit., p. 2.

of materials to be covered was limited. Even so, the use of several sources which was necessary to minimize the problems of consistency and completeness entailed a great deal of reading and coding.

The collection and coding of events began with an examination of the following seven sources, all of which were used by Burrowes and Spector.²

- (1) The New York Times Index
- (2) The New York Times (every entry mentioned in the Index was read)
- (3) The Middle East Journal (its quarterly chronology)
- (4) Keesing's Contemporary Archives
- (5) Deadline Data
- (6) Facts on File
- (7) The Asian Recorder.

The events themselves were defined operationally in terms of the following question: Who did what to whom (or it) when and where? Thus, in reading through the sources, events could be isolated in terms of their spatio-temporal occurrence. There were, of course, problems in applying this rule. In some cases, inadequate information did not permit the kind of isolation implied by the aforementioned rule. To some extent, the author

²Complete references (place of publication, etc.) are included in the Bibliography.

had to rely on context to describe events adequately. Since the operational rule of one event to one coding sheet was used, problems arose in coding multiple events. For example, a rally on March 14 in Tel Aviv turned into a riot in which twenty citizens and police were injured. Although not explicit, one gathers that the intention of the organizers had not been to organize a riot, since the Mapam Party (the organizer) was a member in good standing of the government coalition. The rally was therefore coded as two events, one violent and the other non-violent. The importance of context, however, has been illustrated. The lack of independence of events is a problem to which there is no easy solution. Burrows and Spector suggest the following as the most practical solution:

The person without considerable expertise in the nation or area in question is almost certain to miscode or exclude a very large number of items. This assertion should not be dismissed as the typical reaction of the country or area specialist to 'global' comparisons. The problem that the non-specialist has in accurately evaluating event data on Syria has little to do with anything as exotic as 'Arab mentality' or the 'pillars of Islam.' It has much more to do with a simple knowledge of the simple facts of Syrian politics.³

In the present study, because the focus was on

³Ibid., pp. 6-7.

Israel alone, the need for an expert knowledge of the entire Middle East was reduced substantially. In fact, because the internal and external workings of Israel are much more open to Western analysts, the reporting of events and the subsequent coding was undoubtedly less of a task than it was for Burrowes and Spector.

Although seven sources were used, the author quickly discovered that it was literally impossible to obtain a consensus among all sources on any but the most obvious events.⁴ To avoid missing a large number of events that had obviously occurred, it was necessary to reduce the required consensus. It was decided that at least three of the sources had to agree on the spatio-temporal character of an event before it was included in the final tally. To an extent, this decision was arbitrary, but it did obviate the problem of undercounting events. Also, since correlations performed between event and perceptual data were almost exactly comparable across the two sets of event data (the author's and Burrowes' and Spector's), strength was added to the belief that the two sets of event data had been gener-

⁴Burrowes and Spector are ambiguous on this point. It is not clear from their discussion whether they were satisfied with the reporting of an event in a single source or attempted to gain a consensus among sources. Ibid., p. 12.

ated by similar means.⁵

The events gleaned from the seven sources were coded in terms of the twenty-six internal and external cooperation and conflict categories used by Burrowes and Spector.⁶ Since the international level of analysis constitutes the focus of this discussion, only the external categories are analyzed here. The events themselves were aggregated into five monthly periods. The Israeli data in this form was comparable to the Burrowes and Spector data.

Israel as a Member of the Middle East Subordinate System

This section consists of a systematic attempt to ascertain to what extent Israel behaved as a member of a Middle East subsystem of nations during the months prior to the War. The event data prepared by the author is used to compare the type and quantity of Israel's interactions with other nations to the type and quantity of her Arab neighbors' interactions with other nations.

A total of 177 Israeli-initiated events towards other nations (excluding the United Nations and other international organizations) were coded across the five

⁵These correlations are discussed in the last section of Chapter IV. The assumption is being made that the relative accuracy of the perceptual data is constant across the January-May period.

⁶A summary of the twenty-six categories is included in the Appendices to this thesis.

month period. Interactions with other Middle East nations were found to represent 44.9 percent of all Israeli interactions. The corresponding figures for her three Arab neighbors over a thirty month period were: Egypt, 48.4 percent; Syria, 63.2 percent; and Jordan, 65.3 percent.⁷ Of the four nations, Israel interacted less with the Middle East than any of her neighbors. Because the data for the three Arab nations encompasses a much longer time period, it is possible to argue that the percentage expressed for Israeli interactions is not a reliable indicator of her involvement in the Middle East. The following table allows one to come to grips with this problem.

TABLE I

ISRAELI INTERACTIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST AS A PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL INTERACTIONS

Interactions	January	February	March	April	May
Middle East	21	10	12	8	28
Total	40	20	35	17	65
Percentage	52.5	50.0	34.3	47.0	43.0

⁷Burrowes and Spector, op. cit., p. 15.

The most obvious argument against a percentage based on the five month period would be that this period was a typically conflictive. There are two weaknesses in this argument. First, it is not obvious that there was a consistent relationship between the amount of conflict and the percentage of interactions with the Middle East. In January, which was a highly conflictive month, interactions with the Arab nations were at a five-month high (in terms of percentage). In May, which was another period of intense conflict, interactions were considerably fewer (in terms of percentage). No consistent relationship between conflict and interactions emerges. Second, to argue that less conflict might induce more interactions is not supported in terms of Table I. The month of March, which by many accounts was the most peaceful in the period, was characterized by the smallest percentage of interactions with the Middle East. Although no completely safe assertion can be made, it seems that the percentage figure for Israeli interactions with the Middle East is quite reliable.⁸

Thus far, the analysis has been conducted in terms of the Middle East as an aggregate of the Arab nations.


⁸In terms of a Middle East subordinate system, Israel appeared to be less a member than any of her three Arab neighbors. To conclude that Israel was not a member of such a system is premature. More analysis is necessary before any pronouncements of this kind can be made.

Since the focus of this study is to be primarily on only three of the Arab nations, it is necessary to re-interpret Israel's interactions with the Middle East in terms of the distinction between all the Arab nations and Syria, Jordan and Egypt. The following figure illustrates this distinction, among others.

From Figure 3 one can see that a majority of interactions with the Arab nations⁹ occurred with Syria, Jordan and Egypt. Thus, to focus this study on these three Arab nations is to capture most of Israel's interactions with the Middle East nations. The graph also illustrates the conflictive nature of Arab-Israeli relations. Almost all of Israel's interactions with her three principal neighbors consisted of conflict of one form or another. This finding corroborates Brecher's description of the Middle East core, which he characterizes as a "war system":¹⁰

⁹The Arab nations are defined as follows: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Persian Gulf States, Yemen, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Turkey and Iran are excluded because of cultural and historical differences. In this study, their inclusion would not have altered the results appreciably as there were only two interactions with these nations in total.

¹⁰Michael Brecher, op. cit., p. 122.



- Interactions with all nations
- - - Interactions with Arab nations
- - - Interactions with Syria, Jordan and Egypt
- . - Conflict with Syria, Jordan and Egypt

FIGURE 3. ISRAELI INTERACTIONS WITH ALL NATIONS AND WITH THE ARAB NATIONS

. . . intense hostile interaction takes place at all three levels--military, diplomatic and psychological. Three wars along with persistent Arab guerrilla tactics and Israeli reprisals reflect a condition of permanent conflict.¹¹

Having sketched the outline of Arab-Israeli relations in the context of the Middle East as a region, it is necessary to widen the scope of the discussion to include an examination of Arab-Israeli relations in the context of interactions with other regions of the world. This portion of the analysis will attempt to ascertain the extent and form of Israel's involvement in the Middle East as compared with the European states.¹² To provide a basis for comparison with the other three Middle East nations, the Israeli data will be displayed with that for Syria, Jordan and Egypt. Figures 4 and 5 depict the average total monthly interactions and conflict for each of the four nations with the Arab and European states as targets of these interactions.

The two sets of figures illustrate one point succinctly--in terms of average monthly interactions, all four nations interacted most frequently with another member of the Middle East region. This fact adds strength

¹¹Ibid., pp. 121-122.

¹²The European states are defined as: Russia, United States, France, Britain and West Germany.

to the argument for the existence of a subordinate system in this region. These figures also illustrate the conflictive nature of Israel's involvement in the Middle East. Both of her interaction partners in the Middle East above the mean average were targets almost totally of Israeli conflictive behavior.

One more set of figures is necessary to complete the profile of Israel's involvement in the various world regions. Figures 6 and 7 depict the average total monthly interactions and conflict for each of the four nations with the major regions of the world.¹³

In terms of the major world regions, each of the four nations interacted most frequently with the Middle East. In three of the four cases, however, interactions with the United States-Western Europe bloc were greater than the mean average of interactions with all regions. This fact tends to support the Burrowes and Spector contention that the Middle East Subordinate System, if it exists, is deeply penetrated by a few highly developed

¹³Burrowes and Spector divided the world into four regions. They are (1) the United States and Western Europe, (2) the Soviet Bloc, (3) the Middle East, and (4) the Third World. These categories are very gross and at best serve only to give a very general picture of interactions. Burrowes and Spector have admitted the need for refinements (Burrowes and Spector, op. cit., p. 15) but since these refinements are not presented, it was necessary to use their categories to render the results comparable.




FIGURE 4. AVERAGE TOTAL INTERACTIONS AND CONFLICT PER MONTH: MIDDLE EAST AND EUROPEAN STATES

(Shaded portion of bars represent that portion of the total which is conflict)




FIGURE 5. AVERAGE TOTAL INTERACTIONS AND CONFLICT PER MONTH: MIDDLE EAST AND EUROPEAN STATES

(Shaded portion of bars represent that portion of the total which is conflict)





FIGURE 6. AVERAGE TOTAL INTERACTIONS AND CONFLICT PER MONTH: THE MAJOR REGIONS.

(Shaded portion of bars represents that portion of total which is conflict)





FIGURE 7. AVERAGE TOTAL INTERACTIONS AND CONFLICT PER MONTH: THE MAJOR REGIONS

(Shaded portion of bars represents that portion of total which is conflict)

Western nations.¹⁴ Of the four nations, Israel had by far the greatest proportion of conflictive interactions with other members of the Middle East. This is true even if Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian interactions with Israel are added in with their Middle East interactions. Of the four nations, then, Israel had the most negative relationship with its neighbors. Since 85 percent of all Israeli interactions with the Middle East occurred with Syria, Jordan and Egypt and since 92 percent of those interactions were conflictive, it is safe to assert that Israel was a member of the Middle East only by virtue of its being a member of the "war system" which constituted the Middle East core. Figures 6 and 7 also illustrate the fact that Israel was by no means ignored by its neighbors. If it is assumed that Israel was a member of the Middle East, Syria and Jordan directed over 50 percent of all Middle East conflict towards Israel.¹⁵ Thus, although her neighbors appeared to be concentrating their efforts on negating Israel's

¹⁴Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁵These percentages would undoubtedly be higher if the five months between January and May 1967 were considered alone. Since this latter period is important for the present study the argument is strengthened by this fact.

existence (or at a minimum, reducing Israeli influence in the Middle East) the net result in terms of interactions was a relatively tightly-knit group of nations, at least in terms of military and security issues.

This last statement expresses the extent to which one can argue for a Middle East subordinate system, if Israel is to be included. In terms of military issues, security issues and politically expressed military and security issues,¹⁶ there would seem to have been an empirically defined group of nations including Israel, Syria, Jordan and Egypt during the months prior to the Six Day War. The analysis presented here supports this contention. Because Israel was in fact the focus of the conflict generated by her three Arab neighbors, she was of necessity more deeply a member of the conflict system that existed than any one of her neighbors.

In terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is the primary focus of this study, it is safe to conclude that a Middle East subordinate system existed during the period being analyzed. To focus on this system as a

¹⁶Examples of politically expressed military and security issues occur during the annual United Nations meetings. In the present study, the confrontations that occurred there provided a useful source of data for the perceptual analysis of the January 2-June 4 period.

level of analysis, then, is to include the most important actors during the period that culminated in the Six Day War.¹⁷

The conclusion reached here is corroborated by Israeli perceptions of the situation during the same period. In an interview given on May 14, the Israeli Chief of Staff expressed his view of the sources of tension as follows:

It would be a mistake to put the reasons for Arab-Israeli tensions on international factors. The sources of the tensions are in the Arab World and not within the larger political sphere.¹⁸

Conflict In the Middle East Core: January Through May, 1967

Utilizing the data from the Burrowes and Spector study, it is possible to compare Arab-initiated and Israeli-initiated conflict towards each other across the five months prior to the War. Although it would

¹⁷This is not to say that extra-regional influences did not affect the course of events. Indeed, the Soviet Union heightened the tensions in May by subscribing to the Syrian and Egyptian claims that Israel was planning to attack Syria. But towards the end of that month, both superpowers attempted to intervene to preserve peace. Their efforts failed, indicating that their influence was not great enough to affect the pattern of Arab-Israeli interactions within the region itself.

¹⁸"Interview With the Chief of Staff," Ma'ariv, Tel-Aviv, May 14, 1967.

be premature to draw more than general conclusions from this analysis, it does provide a first approximation to the pattern of Arab-Israeli interactions in the months prior to the War. This pattern can then be analyzed in greater detail from the Israeli perspective, using the perceptual analysis to be presented in Chapter IV.

The conflict dyads between Israel and the three Arab nations are presented in Figures 8-11.

The most striking feature of these figures is the relatively low level of Israeli conflict towards the three Arab states. The single point at which Israeli conflict towards the Arab states exceeded Arab conflict towards Israel was the month of March. This was due to Israeli conflict towards Syria. The Syrian-Israeli dyad presents the researcher with an opportunity to apply (in a tentative manner) the conflict spiral theory derived by the Stanford group out of their study of the 1914 crisis. North, Brody and Holsti describe the spiral as follows:

If state A--either correctly or incorrectly--perceives itself as threatened by state B, there is a high probability that A will respond with threats or hostile actions. As state B begins to perceive this hostility directed toward itself, it is probable that B, too, will behave in a hostile (and defen-






FIGURE 8. JORDANIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT: JANUARY THROUGH MAY 1967.



— Egypt as actor
 - - - Israel as actor

* Egyptian conflict towards Israel in May was 50.

FIGURE 9. EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT: JANUARY THROUGH MAY 1967



— Syria as actor
 - - - Israel as actor

FIGURE 10. SYRIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT: JANUARY THROUGH MAY 1967




FIGURE 11. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: JANUARY THROUGH MAY 1967

sive) manner. This threatening behavior by B will convince A that its initial perceptions were correct, and A will be inclined to increase its hostile (and defensive) activity. Thereafter, the exchanges between the two parties will become increasingly negative, threatening and injurious.¹⁹

In the present situation Syria (state A) may have perceived Israeli hostilities that were directed at it in March. The Syrian reaction may well have been the increase in hostilities towards Israel during the first week in April which resulted in the air battle on April 7. From that point, Syrian perceptions of Israeli intentions may have become very negative, resulting in the sharp increases in hostility that occurred during April and May, as well as the desire to involve Egypt as a defensive measure.

One of the objectives of the perceptual analysis to be presented in the next chapter will be to explicate the Israeli viewpoint during this period. This may in fact reveal that a conflict spiral could have had its beginning during this period.

The interactions analysis presented in this section

¹⁹O.R. Holsti, R.C. North, and R.A. Broady, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," in J.D. Singer (ed.), Quantitative International Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p. 133.

has at least two limitations which hamper its usefulness. First, the data is aggregated on a monthly basis. This fact does not permit one to map any changes that occur within months. In terms of the period prior to the Six Day War, this is a serious shortcoming. During the month of May, for example, there were at least two distinct periods. Until May 15, Egypt was not involved in the Syrian-Israeli conflict directly. From that date, however, the situation was changed radically by the movement of Egyptian forces into the Sinai desert. The Burrows and Spector approach cannot capture this distinction. The second shortcoming is the absence of a weighting factor for different kinds of conflictive behavior. There are obvious differences, for example, between a protest in the United Nations and a tank battle in Northern Israel. Thus, although useful for a gross analysis of interactions among the four Middle East nations, the Burrows and Spector approach is not adequate in itself for a study of the period prior to the Six Day War.

Summary

This chapter has served two purposes. First, it has brought data to bear on the question of whether there is a Middle East subordinate system. On the basis of the

analysis conducted, the conclusion was reached that the four nations that have been considered in this study constitute an identifiable group on a military-security dimension. This fact simplifies the task of searching for possible causes of the Six Day War in that the search can be focused on the Middle East itself. The second purpose has been to trace, approximately, the patterns of conflict prior to the War itself.

The fact that Israel functioned as a member of the Middle East core enhances the relevance of the perceptual analysis to be presented in Chapter IV. By focusing on Israeli perceptions, it should be possible to obtain a meaningful profile of the Arab-Israeli conflict from January through to June 4.

CHAPTER IV

A PERCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE PERIOD PRIOR TO THE SIX DAY WAR

Introduction

An inherent assumption in analyzing conflict escalation in the prelude to World War I and the de-escalation process in the Cuban missile crisis has been that conflict reduction is to a certain extent the reverse of conflict escalation.¹

This and other reasons justify a quantitative longitudinal analysis of the actions, reactions and interactions of nation-states for the purpose of analyzing conflict reduction in the Middle East as a subsystem of the international system.² (underlining in original text).

Although the study called for is much broader than the present project, the latter has treated the Middle East core as a subordinate system (or subsystem) and it has also focused on a time span during which de-escalation and escalation both occurred. In this sense, the present study is

¹The person quoted is referring to the following studies: O.R. Holsti, R.C. North, and R.A. Brody, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," in J.D. Singer (ed.), Quantitative International Politics (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 123-128; O.R. Holsti, et al., "The Management of International Crisis, Affect and Action in Soviet-American Relations," in D.G. Pruitt and R.C. Snyder (eds.), Theory and Research on the Causes of War (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 62-79.

²Joseph Ben-Dak, "Time for Reorientation: A Review of Recent Research on the Arab-Israeli Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14 (1970, No. 1), p. 108.

in keeping with the suggestions made by Mr. Ben-Dak.³

The content analysis of Israeli documents pertaining to Arab-Israeli relations during the January through May period reveals important differences between the January and May conflicts that might be useful in accounting for the de-escalation in January and the escalation in May which ended with the War. For this reason, the content analysis which follows is a valuable addition to a study of the period prior to the Six Day War.

This chapter will be divided into six sections. The first consists of a discussion of content analysis as a research technique. Section two describes the process by which the decision-makers were chosen for this study. Section three discusses the documents utilized and the methods employed to collect these documents. Section four describes the coding categories and discusses briefly the coding procedures themselves. The fifth section consists of a presentation and interpretation of the content analysis itself and section six consists of correlations performed between perceptual and event data, together with a discussion of the implications of these correlations.

³Because Ben-Dak refers to Holsti, et al., he seems to be calling for similar kinds of research to the present study.

Section One - Content Analysis as a Research Technique

Content analysis is not a technique that is applicable to all foreign policy research problems in all situations. Most of the social scientists who use the technique admit that in comparison to direct interviews, it is a secondary data source. In research into the dynamics of crisis decision-making, however, direct interviews with decision-makers as a crisis is developing are not very often possible. The researcher must therefore make a choice between doing a historical-descriptive analysis of a given situation or doing a quantitative study with the limited amount of data that is available.⁴ If he makes the latter choice, then content analysis is one technique that he might find useful.

As a research method in the study of foreign policy decision-making, content analysis can be used to make inferences about motives or affective states of individual decision-makers from the recorded statements they make.⁵ Robert Mitchell has stated the relationship between statements and inferred motives as follows:

Content analyses are typically concerned with the

⁴The researcher can, of course, combine the two approaches.

⁵Content analysis can also be used to gain insights into decision-makers' concern with different aspects of their environment.

middle phase of a three-step communication process: (1) various motives produce (2) a message that is (3) intended to express these motives and/or to produce various effects on a designated audience. . . . (M)ost academic content analysis investigations seem to be concerned primarily with making inferences about the relationship between messages and the antecedents producing them.⁶

In the present study, for example, a quantified study of perceived hostility, time, and alternatives is used to make inferences about the degree of stress experienced by decision-makers.

This procedure is by no means free of problems. The assumption that motives can be inferred from communications has been attacked and defended for as long as content analysis has been used for this purpose. Content analysis has been used successfully to study personality characteristics of individuals.⁷ During the Second World War, it was used successfully to study Nazi propaganda with the end in mind of predicting significant changes in German strategy.⁸ Those who defend content

⁶Robert E. Mitchell, "The Use of Content Analysis for Explanatory Studies," Public Opinion Quarterly, 31 (1967), p. 236.

⁷For example of such a study see: Gordon W. Allport, "Letters From Jenny," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 41 (1946), pp. 315-350 and 449-480.

⁸For one account of this procedure see: H.D. Lasswell et al., op. cit.

analysis point out that there is simply too much reliable empirical evidence available to deny that characteristics of messages indicate the way individuals think, even in situations where role may be an important (theoretically relevant) variable.⁹ Those who question the inference assumption claim that the content of messages is primarily a function of the situation (role and audience expectations) and not of the individual's motives. In one of the most compelling critiques of the inference assumption (and indeed, the whole technique), John Meuller concluded his comments by noting:¹⁰ ". . . it seems clear that the method (content analysis) has proved itself worthy at least in some areas--especially that of crisis behavior."¹¹

A second important controversy exists concerning the use of frequency counts as a means of gauging the degree of concern felt by decision-makers about various

⁹See, for example: O.R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6 (1962), pp. 244-251.

¹⁰John E. Meuller, "The Use of Content Analysis in International Relations," paper delivered at the National Conference on Content Analysis, University of Pennsylvania, November, 1967. If the reader wishes to read a comprehensive discussion of nearly all the problems inherent in using the technique, he is urged to read this paper.

¹¹Ibid., p. 15.

issues. Gilbert Winham has described these criticisms in the following manner:

It is argued that policy-makers frequently strike certain themes in public communications which are in accord with the accepted values of the society. These themes are not an indication of how decision-makers feel about an objective situation, but only indicate acceptance of generalized group norms, or on occasion, acceptance of the values of the immediate audience.¹²

Since public documents are used in the present study, it might be argued that Israeli leaders did nothing more (or even primarily nothing more) than verbalize those themes that were appropriate for the audience and the situation. The weakness of this argument rests in the fact that Israel was literally surrounded by Arab nations which deeply mistrusted all Israeli behavior, be it verbal or non-verbal. In the period prior to the Six Day War, negative affect was especially intense, increasing the danger that remarks made by Israeli leaders would be interpreted in their worst possible light. Thus, if Israeli leaders were to make statements that were not supported by Israeli policy or intentions, they could have

¹²G.R. Winham, "The Use of Quantitative Indicators in Foreign Policy Analysis," paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, University of Calgary, Alberta, June, 1968, p. 8.

been trapped by the policy implications of such statements. In one situation, this did apparently occur. During the first two weeks of May certain Israeli officials including Eshkol threatened a retaliatory raid against Syria. On May 11, the Prime Minister stated: "In view of the 14 incidents in the past month alone, we may have to adopt measures no less drastic than those of April 7."¹³

The Syrian government apparently took these comments very seriously, because it subsequently managed to involve Egypt in a mobilization along Israel's southern border to reduce the probability of an Israeli attack on Syria. In any case, the point has been made--the nature of the Middle East conflict effectively limited the extent to which public statements could diverge from policies, at least for Israel. In this study, then, the frequency assumption seems quite reasonable.¹⁴

Section Two - Choosing the Decision-Makers

In their work on the 1914 crisis, the Stanford group assumed that relying on certain institutionally

¹³The Jerusalem Post, May 13, 1967, p. 1.

¹⁴Since this study relies only partly on the frequency assumption, the controversy can be obviated somewhat. Section five includes a discussion of a technique that was used to scale themes for expressed hostility.

important positions was an adequate means of identifying the most important individual decision makers. This approach may in fact have been adequate for that particular study, but it tends to oversimplify the decision-making process in general. Winham has cogently stated the weakness of the Stanford group's approach: "As time progresses, new faces come to occupy both formal and informal positions of influence; and as the issues change, different personalities with special abilities or interests are heard from."¹⁵

To incorporate this fact into content analyses of foreign policy decision-making, it is necessary to use a procedure that takes account of the issue-specific nature of decision-making elites.¹⁶

¹⁵G.R. Winham, op. cit., p. 10 (underlining mine).

¹⁶Winham's discussion of the nature of these elites and their relationship with non-decision-makers in a given situation bears repeating: "The relationship between the most important decision-makers and those who are not immediately involved in the decision process can be conceptualized by viewing the nation as a pyramid of individuals with the leading decision-makers at the apex of the pyramid. The cutoff point between decision-makers and 'non-decision-makers' is an uncertain boundary which fluctuates with time and with the content of the decision . . . (T)hus each new time period and each new issue produce a different pyramid with a unique boundary and a unique mix of key decision-makers. The problem for the analyst is to know which personalities fit the leading decision-maker roles and where to draw the line between those decision-makers and others in the political structure." Ibid., p. 10.

In his study of the Marshall Plan decision, Winham developed a four-step procedure which can be adopted for the present study. First, the researcher must ascertain approximately how much material he is capable of handling in the time he has available. In the Six Day War case, it was decided that the documents generated by ten decision-makers would constitute a quota. The researcher must then select the ten most important formal decision-making positions and their incumbents. This list, of course, would reflect the nature of the decision being made. Thus, those individuals who would directly be a part of Israeli decisions vis a vis the Arab-Israeli conflict would be chosen. Third, this list must be corroborated with a definitive history of the decision-making period and fourth, the researcher must count the number of times a given decision-maker's name appears in a newspaper¹⁷ under the headings relevant to the decision being studied.¹⁸

¹⁷This newspaper (although Winham does not state it) should be a relatively complete and objective chronicle of the events that pertained to the particular decision being studied.

¹⁸Winham, op. cit., p. 11. The author is also indebted to W. Vanderelst for his suggestions regarding the use of this procedure for the study of the Arab-Israeli situation. Mr. Vanderelst used the Winham method (with his own modifications) in his thesis: W. Vanderelst, "An Analysis of Crisis Decision-Making: The Spanish-American War, 1898." Unpublished Master's thesis, McMaster University, 1969.

The second step of Winham's procedure presented the author with an unusual situation. Because the Israeli government coalition was broadened on June 1, and because the decision to go to war was not made until June 3, it was necessary to include those people who joined the government on June 1, as candidates for decision-making roles.¹⁹ With this in mind, the following ten positions and their incumbents were chosen.

TABLE II

FORMAL DECISION-MAKING POSITIONS AND INCUMBENTS

<u>Position</u>	<u>Individual</u>
Prime Minister	Levi Eshkol
Foreign Minister	Abba Eban
Director-General of Foreign Ministry	Arye Levavi
Representatives to the United Nations	Michael Comay Shabtai Rosenne Gideon Rafael
Minister of Defense	Levi Eshkol (to June 1) Moshe Dayan (from June 1)
Deputy Minister of Defense	Zvi Dinstein
Director-General of Ministry of Defense	M. Kashti
Chief of Staff	Yitzhak Rabin
Chief of General Staff Branch	Ezer Weizmann
Chairman of Foreign Affairs and Security committee	David Hacohen

¹⁹This decision was not as arbitrary as it seems. Because Eshkol did in fact consult the opposition from May 23 onwards, these people could be considered as de facto members of the government from that date. Thus, to exclude them would be to ignore their influence on the final decision to go to war.

The third step involved corroborating this list with an authoritative history of the period prior to the War. Because of the contemporary nature of the conflict, there was some doubt that any single account could be considered authoritative. It is more reasonable to assume that each author's account of this period would rely on materials gained through interviews and informal meetings which would not necessarily expose them to the same facts. To remedy this problem, it was decided to use three books that cover this period in detail. They were Walter Lequeur's book, The Road to Jerusalem;²⁰ Theodore Draper's book, Israel and World Politics;²¹ and Randolph and Winston Churchill's book, The Six Day War.²² Because each of these authors refers to Israeli leaders in the context of inter-party negotiations as well as in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict, an effort was made to record only those references that pertained to Israeli leaders in the latter context. References to decision-makers in each of these three books are presented in the following tables.

²⁰W. Lequeur, op. cit.

²¹T. Draper, op. cit.

²²Churchill and Churchill, op. cit.

TABLE III

NUMBER OF REFERENCES TO DECISION-MAKERS IN
LEQUEUR

<u>Decision-Makers</u>	<u>References</u>
Levi Eshkol	78
Abba Eban	62
Moshe Dayan	33
Yitzhak Rabin	19
Negal Allon	18
David Ben-Gurion	11
Golda Meir	10
Menachem Begin	9
Shimon Peres	8
David Hacoheh	2
Arye Levavi	2
Ezer Weizmann	1

TABLE IV

NUMBER OF REFERENCES TO DECISION-MAKERS IN CHURCHILL AND
CHURCHILL

<u>Decision-Makers</u>	<u>References</u>
Dayan	33
Eshkol	22
Eban	19
Ben-Gurion	7
Peres	7
Rabin	6
Begin	6
Allon	6
Meir	5
Weizmann	1

TABLE V

NUMBER OF REFERENCES TO DECISION-MAKERS IN
DRAPER

<u>Decision-Makers</u>	<u>References</u>
Eshkol	44
Eban	16
Rabin	14
Dayan	9
Ben-Gurion	5
Rafael	3
Levavi	1

Several facts are apparent from these three tables. First, Eshkol, Eban, Dayan, and Rabin all figured prominently in each of the three accounts of the period. For this reason, they were considered very strong candidates for the final list. The second and somewhat surprising feature was the absence of several individuals who filled the posts listed in Table II. Hachohen, Levavi and Weizmann all appeared to be relatively insignificant. On the basis of the three histories, they were therefore considered as weak candidates for the final list. Dinstein and Kashti were not mentioned once by any of the three authors, so they were considered extremely weak candidates for the final list. The third feature of these tables was the importance of several individuals who were not a part of the

institutionally-defined decision-making structure. Yigal Allon, as Minister of Labor, and Golda Meir, as Chairman of the Mapai Secretariat, both ranked reasonably high on two of the three lists. Two leaders of the right-wing Rafi Party, Shimon Peres, the Party Secretary, and David Ben-Gurion, who founded the Party in 1965, were mentioned frequently. Menachem Begin, leader of the right-wing Herut-Liberal bloc (Gahal bloc) ranked on two of the three lists.

The appearance of Allon and Meir is not surprising considering their relationship with Eshkol. In the final negotiations that occurred prior to Dayan's appointment as Defense Minister, Eshkol supported Allon for that position and conceded to Dayan's appointment only when Allon withdrew his own name.²³ Golda Meir had also supported Allon's candidacy²⁴ and had also consistently supported Eshkol's position on the need for negotiations with the Western Powers to reopen the Straits of Tiran by an international effort. Begin, Peres and Ben-Gurion had all been involved in the government consultations with the opposition parties since May 23, and all were considered as

²³The Jerusalem Post, June 1. p. 1.

²⁴Ibid.

candidates for cabinet portfolios as negotiations proceeded to widen the government. When the government was broadened on June 1, Ben-Gurion and Peres preferred to see Dayan appointed Defense Minister. Begin did accept the position of Minister Without Portfolio.²⁵

To this point, the list of candidates for final decision-making positions was somewhat confusing. Winham's fourth step involved the author's reading The Jerusalem Post from January 2 through June 4 and counting the number of times the various candidates' names were mentioned. The results are reported in Table VI.

This last step served to clarify the confusion created by step three. The first nine individuals on the list would seem to be directly transferable to the final list. It is worth noting that three representatives in the United Nations together ranked as high as the fifth position on the list. Their reappearance confirms their relevance to the making of Israeli policy vis a vis the

²⁵For an excellent description of the inter-party negotiations that occurred between May 23 and June 1, see W. Lequeur, op. cit., pp. 131-159.

TABLE VI

REFERENCES TO DECISION-MAKERS IN THE JERUSALEM POST

<u>Decision-Maker</u>	<u>References</u>
Eshkol	273
Eban	244
Dayan	75
Rabin	57
Meir	48
Allon	39
Ben-Gurion	37
Peres	34
Begin	30
Comay, Rosenne, Rafael	48
Levavi	12
Dinstein	12
Hacohen	8
Weizmann	7

Arab-Israeli situation.²⁶ Although not directly involved in the policy-making process in Jerusalem, the United Nations representatives did articulate the perceptions of the Israeli Foreign Ministry throughout this period. They acted on the instructions from their government and their inclusion in the final list of decision-makers is consistent with the desire to capture all perceptions of the Israeli decision-makers.²⁷

²⁶It is not surprising that the United Nations representatives were not mentioned in the three histories used in step three, as these accounts dealt primarily with the period in terms of the reactions, etc. of Israeli leaders within Israel itself.

²⁷In a conversation with the author, Professor James Barrington of the History Department, who was the Burmese ambassador to the United Nations for ten years, stated that

The final list of decision-makers and their positions is presented in Table VIII.

TABLE VII

FINAL LIST OF DECISION-MAKERS AND POSITIONS HELD

Eshkol	Prime Minister and Minister of Defense until June 1
Dayan	Minister of Defense from June 1
Eban	Foreign Minister
Allon	Minister of Labor
Meir	Chairman of Mapai Secretariat
Rabin	Chief of Staff
Ben-Gurion	Rafi Party Leader
Peres	Rafi Party Secretary
Begin	Minister Without Portfolio
Comay, Rosenne, Rafael	Ambassadors to the United Nations

Section Three - Document Sources and Collection Procedures

Since documents for this content analysis were entirely from the public domain and were, in part, untranslated from Hebrew, several problems had to be solved which are unique to a study of this kind. Initially, the author read the Jerusalem Post and noted all references to speeches,

there was no problem involved in assuming that United Nations representatives articulate their governments' perceptions and not their own. For a view which focuses on the freedom of delegates in certain non-crisis situations, see: Jack Vincent, "The Convergence of Voting and Attitude Patterns at the United Nations," The Journal of Politics, 4 (1969), pp. 952-983.

etc. made by the decision-makers in Table VII during the January 2 through June 4 period. This list was supplemented by reading through all available accounts of the period and noting additional references to speeches. A final list of required documents was compiled in preparation for the data collection task itself. Fortunately, the author was able to gain the assistance of Dr. Meron Medzini, who is head of the News Agency for the Israeli Government. The list of documents was forwarded to him and in due course the materials arrived. Those documents that were in Hebrew were translated into English.²⁸ In addition to the documents from Israel, the author was fortunate enough to acquire the provisional records of the Security Council Debates held from May 24 through June 3, 1967, together with all the letters submitted to the Security Council by the Israeli representatives during the January 2 - June 4 period. A total of fifty-seven documents were acquired totalling 56,920 words. The breakdown of these documents according to their form is presented in Table VIII.

²⁸Although Hebrew is by no means easy to translate, the English equivalents of Hebrew tend to be relatively precise. This is due to the large amount of Hebrew that is translated for the benefit of the English-speaking nations. Among the course of this study, for example, 70 percent of all the documents used were already translated into English.

TABLE VIII
FORM OF DOCUMENTS COLLECTED

Kind of Document	Number	Words
Letters to Security Council	19	12,220
Public Speeches	12	11,180
Magazine Interviews	5	5,510
Press Statements	12	18,020
Knesset Speeches	9	9,990
	<u>57</u>	<u>56,920</u>

Table IX presents the total number of words that were content analyzed for each decision-maker.

TABLE IX
TOTAL NUMBER OF WORDS FOR DECISION-MAKERS

Decision-Makers	Total Words
Eshkol	11,230
Dayan	1,050
Eban	17,260
Allon	2,530
Meir	110
Rabin	2,170
Ben-Gurion	110
Peres	1,190
Begin	1,760
Comay, Rosenne, Rafael	<u>19,510</u>
	<u>56,920</u>

Although the author managed to collect nearly all of those documents which he knew to exist, the problem of sampling still exists.²⁹ This problem, which affects the validity of any conclusions that are drawn, is essentially unsolvable from a methodological point of view. Practically speaking, however, public documents alone have been used successfully in several major content analytic studies to date. These precedents are the best form of evidence for the usefulness of studies such as the present one.³⁰

Section Four - Coding Categories and Coding Procedures

Content analysis stands or falls by its categories. Particular studies have been productive to the extent that the categories were clearly formulated and well adapted to the problem and the content. Although competent performance in other parts of the analytic process is also necessary, the formulation and definition of appropriate categories takes on a central importance. Since the categories contain the substance of the investigation, a content analysis can be no better than its categories.³¹

²⁹Essentially, this refers to the fact that not all documents on a certain decision are available to the researcher, increasing the chance that his results are biased in a direction he cannot even ascertain.

³⁰Three examples of such studies are: Winham's study of the Marshall Plan decision, op. cit., and O.R. Holsti's study of John Foster Dulles' perceptions in relation to his belief system, op. cit. Recently an article appeared in which the author used public documents alone to content analyze the period prior to and after the Suez War. R.M. Siverson, "International Conflict and Perceptions of Injury: The Case of the Suez Crisis," International Studies Quarterly, 14: 2 (1970), pp. 157-165.

³¹Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952), p. 147.

This quotation places in perspective the importance of sound coding categories. In the present study, because most of the categories have been used in other studies, their reliability was ensured. Six coding categories were used and were defined so that they remained mutually exclusive throughout the study. The six categories were:³² (1) hostility, (2) time, (3) alternatives, (4) friendship, (5) peace, and (6) power.

The category of peace, which was the only one unique to this study, was defined as any perception which expressed a desire for peace or a desire for the normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab nations. It is noteworthy that this category tended to overlap with the category of change in status quo used by the Stanford group.³³ If the two were to be used concomitantly in further research, the definitions would have to be revised to ensure that they would be mutually exclusive.

³²These categories are defined in Appendix I of this thesis.

³³This category is referred to in North, et al., op. cit., p. 52.

The coding itself involved reducing the documents to themes which consisted of one subject, one verb, and one object. To be more exact, each theme consisted of: (1) the perceiver of the affect or action expressed; (2) the actor whose affect or action is being perceived; (3) the target or recipient of the action or expressed affect; and (4) the descriptive-connective or the nature of the action or affect being expressed.³⁴

Diagrammatically, the relation between these four components is as follows:³⁵




FIGURE 12. COMPONENTS OF THE TYPICAL PERCEPTUAL UNIT

A statement like, "Egypt is threatening Israel's existence," when stated by Abba Eban, would be coded with Eban as the perceiver, Egypt as the perceived, Israel as the target, and "is threatening" as the descriptive-connective.³⁶ The fifty-seven documents, once coded, yielded

³⁴Ibid., p. 45.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶In coding the documents, the author followed the rules outlined in two manuals: Michael Haas, "Thematic Content Analysis in the Study of Diplomatic Documents," Stanford University Conflict and Integration Study Group, Stanford University, August 1961, and the manual developed by Winham for his study of the Marshall Plan Decision.

a total of 1,264 themes or perceptual units which could then be manipulated (recoded, counted, etc.) to make them more amenable to the answering of specific questions. The author coded the entire set of documents, but because of the importance of ensuring the reliability of the procedures followed in this study, his assistant coded two documents chosen at random from the entire set of documents. Using the formula $R = 2(C_{1,2}) / C_1 + C_2$, where the number of coding agreements between the two coders is divided by the sum of all themes coded by the two coders,³⁷ an intercoder reliability coefficient was established. The coefficient in this case was .78 which compares favorably with other content analyses of this kind. The author also established an intra-coder reliability coefficient. One document that had been coded at the outset of the analysis was coded again two weeks later. The coefficient in this case was .91.

Section Five - Data Analysis and Results

Initially, the documents were coded in terms of the six categories outlined in Section Four. Because the number of words per time period varied greatly, it was

³⁷North et al., op. cit., p. 49.

necessary to adopt a method used by Winham whereby the ratio of the number of themes to the number of words per period becomes the unit of analysis, instead of the absolute number of themes alone.³⁸ To know, for example, that the number of time themes increased over time is inconsequential if the total number of words analyzed increased proportionately. Table X presents the unadjusted and adjusted frequencies of perceptions across the eleven periods that were studied. This table gives a general picture of Israeli perceptions during the January 2 - June 4 period. The most prominent feature is the extremely high number of perceptions of hostility that were expressed, relative to all other perceptions. This fact alone indicates the nature of Arab-Israeli relations during this period.

It is noteworthy that the highest rates of hostility to total words occurred in January during the intense Israeli-Syrian border conflict. This peak surpassed by far even the second highest peak during the May 8-21 period. It is tempting to conclude from this that a high frequency of perceived hostility themes was not a necessary

³⁸Winham, op. cit., p. 13.

TABLE X

FREQUENCIES OF ALL PERCEPTIONS, UNADJUSTED AND ADJUSTED ACROSS JANUARY 2-JUNE 4
PERIOD

	Jan. 2-15	Jan. 16-19	Jan.30- Feb.12	Feb. 13-26	Feb.27- Mar.12	Mar. 13-26	Mar.27 -Apr.9	April 10-23	Apr.24 -May 7	May 8-21	May 22- June 4	Total	Percent
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11			
Time	7	9	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	42	64	5.2
Alternatives	4	11	2	2	1	1	3	2	1	4	59	90	7.1
Hostility	121	115	27	16	38	20	36	30	4	57	419	883	69.9
Peace	4	8	8	7	0	1	5	1	5	1	53	93	7.3
Power	0	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	0	7	48	61	4.9
Friendship	0	2	0	12	0	0	0	3	4	2	50	73	5.8
All Perceptions	136	146	40	37	39	24	45	37	15	74	671	1,264	100.0
Words	3,100	12,190	2,910	2,010	2,110	1,060	1,910	1,940	880	2,680	25,130		
Words/1,000	3.1	12.19	2.91	2.01	2.11	1.06	1.91	1.94	.88	2.68	25.13		
Time (Adj.)	2.26	.74	.69	0	0	0	0	0	1.14	1.12	1.67		
Alternatives (Adj.)	1.29	.90	.69	1.00	.47	.94	1.57	1.03	1.14	1.49	2.35		
Hostility (Adj.)	39.03	8.91	9.28	7.96	18.01	18.87	18.85	15.46	4.55	21.27	16.67		
Peace (Adj.)	1.29	.66	2.75	3.48	0	.94	2.62	.52	5.68	.37	2.11		
Power (Adj.)	0	.08	.34	0	0	1.89	.52	.52	0	2.61	1.91		
Friendship (Adj.)	0	.16	0	5.97	0	0	0	1.55	4.55	.75	1.99		
All Perceptions (Adj.)	43.87	11.98	13.75	18.41	18.48	22.64	23.56	19.07	17.05	27.61	26.70		

condition for the major conflict in June, but such a conclusion would ignore the intensity aspect of hostility. Until the latter is examined, any statements about the relationship between hostility and the preconditions for the Six Day War are at best tentative. The categories of Time and Alternatives, which are important for testing Holsti's hypotheses are not appreciably more important than any of the other three categories. This fact alone, however, is insufficient to verify or deny his hypotheses.

To bring the data to a form more appropriate for hypothesis testing, it was necessary to convert all the unadjusted frequencies of perceptions in Table X into percentages of the total perceptions in each period. The result is a measure of the relative saliency of each category during each period. The results are reported in Table XI. The data as reported in this table can be used directly to test one of Holsti's hypotheses (the one involving saliency of time) but such a test will be postponed until the antecedents of time and alternatives--crisis and stress--are examined systematically.

TABLE XI

CATEGORIES OF PERCEPTIONS EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PERCEPTIONS PER PERIOD

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Time	5.1	6.2	5.0	0	0	0	0	0	6.7	4.1	6.3
Alternatives	2.9	7.5	5.0	5.4	2.6	4.2	6.7	5.4	6.7	5.4	8.8
Hostility	89.0	78.8	67.5	43.2	97.4	83.3	80.0	81.1	26.7	77.0	62.4
Peace	2.9	5.5	20.0	18.9	0	4.2	11.1	2.7	33.3	1.4	7.9
Power	0	.7	2.5	0	0	8.3	2.2	2.7	0	9.5	7.2
Friendship	0	1.4	0	32.4	0	0	0	8.1	26.7	2.7	7.4
Totals	99.9	100.1	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.1	100.1	100.0

In Chapter I, a four stage stimulus--response framework was utilized to describe the behavior of decision-makers in crisis situations. At that time, crisis was defined as the perceptual response to an external stimulus or set of stimuli. In other words, crisis was the (r) phase in the S - r-s - R sequence. Although an analytical distinction was made between crisis and stress, no attempt was made to verify the distinction empirically. In the present analysis, such a distinction can and will be made.

In her work on the 1914 crisis, Diana Zinnes drew a distinction between perceived threat and perceived actions as two sub-categories of the broader category of hostility.³⁹ The distinction was made on the basis of the tense of the descriptive--connective in each hostility theme.⁴⁰ The statement, "Egypt has moved her forces into the Sinai," is coded as an action statement, whereas the statement, "Israel will protect her right of free passage," is coded a threat statement. All hostility statements were recoded as threat or action statements, yielding a total of forty threat statements out of a total

³⁹ Diana Zinnes, "The Expression and Perception of Hostility in Prewar Crisis: 1914," in J.D. Singer (ed.), Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 85-119.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 98. Essentially, all statements of past or present tense are action statements, and all statements of future tense are threat statements.

of 883 hostility statements.⁴¹

The distribution of these statements (most were bunched into the last period) precluded any scaling for intensity. The following table, however, expresses threat themes as a percentage of all themes over time, giving an index of the saliency of this sub-category.

TABLE XII

PERCEIVED THREAT AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL PERCEPTIONS

Time Period	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Total Perceptions	136	146	40	37	39	24	45	37	15	74	671
Threat	1	2	0	0	1	1	2	1	0	2	30
Percent	.7	1.3	0	0	2.6	4.2	4.4	2.7	0	2.7	4.5

⁴¹Unfortunately, most of these forty statements expressed Israeli threats towards the Arab nations, which is contrary to the relevant defining characteristic of crisis, that is, a perceived threat to high priority values. It is interesting to note that of the 30 statements in the last fourteen days prior to the War, 80 percent concerned Israel's right of passage through the Straits of Tiran. Thus, although Israeli decision-makers did not express perceived threat towards high priority values, they did express threats towards the Arab nations about this particular high priority value. Indirectly then, it is possible to surmise that Israeli leaders were concerned about Arab threats (and/or actions) against their high priority values.

In terms of this table, perceived threats were most salient during the March 27 - April 9 period, when the clash with Syria occurred, and during the May 22 - June 4 period just prior to the War.⁴²

In Chapter I an attempt was made to operationalize the concept of stress in terms of two reduction sentence indicators. They were: (1) In a crisis situation, stress is increasing if and only if the mean intensity of perceptions of inter-nation hostility increases over time. (2) In a crisis situation, stress is increasing if and only if the mean intensity of violence (or potential violence) of actions increases over time.

To verify that stress was increasing, it was necessary to scale all Israeli perceptions of hostile actions (as opposed to threats) and all Israeli actions

⁴²More extensive conclusions than this statement would be suspect, given the distribution of threat themes across the eleven periods.

during the January 2 - June 4 period.⁴³

The scaling technique used involved taking a random sample of eighteen statements (or however many the researcher wishes to use in creating his scale) from the population of themes, and comparing all eighteen statements by pairs. For a sample of eighteen statements 153 comparisons are made. Based on the number of votes each statement gets (the number of times it is the strongest statement of a given pair), the statements are rank-ordered and collapsed into a nine or a six point scale, which is then used to scale all other themes.⁴⁴

⁴³The latter operation involved taking the data derived using the Burrowes and Spector approach and scaling all Israeli non-verbal behavior (acts) towards the Arab nations across the eleven periods. It should be noted that this approach is not completely congruent with the technique used by the Stanford group in their study of the 1914 crisis. They used a series of military histories together with newspapers to compile their list of scalable events. More importantly, they scaled events initiated by both sides, which the author was unable to do. It may have been possible to compile a list of all military activities, but its veracity would have been doubtful as many details of troop movements, etc., were and still are military secrets.

For a summary of the techniques in the 1914 study, see: R.C. North, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," Journal of International Affairs, 21 (1967), p. 119.

⁴⁴For a full description of this scaling technique, including details of reliability tests, see: North, et al., op. cit., pp. 79-89. In creating the scale for the perceptual data, only three ties occurred, which meant that a nine-point scale could be created. Four ties occurred in ranking the event data items, so the author collapsed the eighteen statements into a six point scale.

No attempt was made to distinguish between Israel as agent or target although 88 percent of all action themes perceived Israel as the target of hostile actions. Since the author's assistant scaled all the perceptual statements, the calculation of a reliability coefficient over time was sufficient. A sample of thirty statements that had been scaled initially were re-scaled a week later. Ninety-one percent of the items were scaled into the same categories.

The results of scaling the perceptions of hostile action are reported in Table XIII.

Unlike the high frequency of perceived hostility, reported in Table X, this measure appears to be much more sensitive to the state of Arab-Israeli relations on a major war to minor conflict continuum. The highest intensity, as one would expect, occurred during the period prior to the War. The second highest peak occurred in January, indicating the seriousness of that conflict. The third highest peak occurred during the March 27 - April 9 interval which coincides with the sudden escalation in the level of Syrian hostilities towards Israel, which resulted in the major battle on April 7. It will be recalled that mention was made in Chapter III of a possible

TABLE XIII

MEAN INTENSITY OF PERCEIVED HOSTILE ACTIONS

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Mean Intensity</u>
1	4.91
2	3.65
3	3.41
4	3.35
5	3.64
6	3.61
7	4.29
8	3.15
9	3.00
10	3.60
11	6.19

conflict spiral which may have begun during this period. The relatively high intensity of perceived hostile actions indicates that the Israelis did in fact respond in kind (perceptually and in terms of actions) to the Syrian hostilities, which may have been prompted in turn by Israeli threats during March. Interestingly though, Israeli perceptions of hostility decreased until May 7, which indicates that if a conflict spiral began, its "period" changed so that Israel did not react to the next Syrian escalation in hostilities until the second week in May.

This measure derived here, since it distinguishes among the conflicts in January, April and May, would seem

to be a very useful measure in this study and, perhaps, in other studies of this kind.

Since the mean intensity of perceived actions increased sharply in the May 22 - June 4 period, it is safe to assert that Israeli leaders were operating under considerably more stress during this period than during previous ones.

The second indicator of stress was the mean intensity of violence or potential violence of Israeli actions across the eleven time periods. The results of scaling the events recorded by the Burrowes and Spector method are presented in Table XIV.⁴⁵

TABLE XIV

MEAN INTENSITY OF VIOLENCE OR POTENTIAL VIOLENCE OF ISRAELI ACTIONS TOWARDS THE ARAB STATES

Time Period	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Mean Intensity	3	2	1	2.8	2	4	2.8	2.3	1	3.3	5.2

Although the results are roughly similar to those presented in Table XIII, this index does not appear to be quite as sensitive as the mean intensity of perceived actions. The major discrepancy from Table XIII is the fact that no local maximum in intensity is recorded for the

⁴⁵The intra-coder reliability calculated over one week was 97 percent.

March 27 - April 9 period. This discrepancy is not surprising given the nature of the event data itself. In comparison to the perceptual data presented, the event analysis of this period does indeed appear to be only a first approximation of the patterns that did in fact exist.

Since the two sets of scaled data were meant to be indicators of the same concept--the level of stress, they should have correlated highly with each other. This was in fact true as a product-moment correlation coefficient of .735 was obtained, which is significant at the .005 level.

Having established that the Israeli decision-makers chosen for this study were under increasing stress as the crisis deepened, it is now possible to test Holsti's hypotheses relating stress to the perceptions of time and alternatives. His hypotheses were stated as follows:

As stress increases in a crisis situation: (1) Time will be perceived as an increasingly salient factor in decision-making. (2) Decision-makers will become increasingly concerned with the immediate rather than the distant future. (3) The perceived range of alternatives open to them will narrow. (4) The perceived range of alter-

natives open to adversaries will broaden.⁴⁶

Table XI can be used to test hypothesis one directly. Expressed as a percentage of all perceptions, perceived time is a factor in the five month period at two points. In January and the first part of February, Israeli leaders were interested in obtaining a quick solution to the Syrian border incidents. In the last part of April and during the month of May, time was again a factor. During the April 24 - May 7 period, the Israelis were again experiencing difficulties with Syrian and Syrian-sponsored acts against Israeli territory. Burrowes and Spector corroborate the fact that guerrilla activities increased steadily from February to the end of April whereupon they diminished as the Arab governments became involved in the conflict.⁴⁷ It is noteworthy that time as a factor does not peak in the May 22 - June 4 period as one would expect. Holsti's hypothesis cannot therefore be unequivocally verified.

To test the second hypothesis, it was necessary to recode the time themes to discriminate between immediate and distant future. References to immediate future were then expressed as a percentage of total time themes

⁴⁶O.R. Holsti, op. cit., p. 365.

⁴⁷Burrowes and Spector, op. cit., p. 26.

per period. The results are presented in Table XV.

TABLE XV

IMMEDIATE FUTURE AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL TIME PERCEPTIONS

Period	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Percentage	57	78	50	--	--	--	--	--	0	67	90

In terms of the table, hypothesis two has been verified.

To test the third hypothesis, it was necessary to recode all perceptions of alternatives into four sub-categories. Following Vanderelst, these perceptions were coded according to the following definitions:

The 'necessity' category includes all statements indicating that the author sees only one possible course of action in a given situation.

The 'closed' category includes all statements indicating that some course of action is not possible.

The 'choice' category includes all statements in which the actor perceives more than one course of action open.

The 'impotence' category includes all statements indicating that some course of action is proceeding without the actor's control.⁴⁸

Since the hypothesis focused on the narrowing of

⁴⁸Vanderelst, op. cit., p. 140.

alternatives, it was necessary to combine the closed, necessity and impotence sub-categories and express the perceptions in these (for self) as a percentage of all perceptions (for self) of alternatives per period. The measure derived indicated the extent to which the Israeli leaders were not perceiving themselves as having choices vis a vis the Arab-Israeli situation. Table XVI presents the results.

TABLE XVI

PERCENTAGE OF ALL ALTERNATIVES PERCEPTIONS FOR SELF THAT ARE
CLOSED, NECESSITY, OR IMPOTENCE

Period	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Percentage	50	80	50	50	0	0	67	0	0	25	93

In terms of Table XVI, Holsti's third hypothesis is supported. It is noteworthy that narrowed alternatives coincides with the three major conflict points during the five month period. Like intensity of perceived hostility, this measure appears to be a sensitive indicator of the degree and scope of the Arab-Israeli conflict during that period.

Difficulties arose when the author attempted to test the fourth hypothesis. Of the 90 perceptions of alternatives coded, only 10 could be coded as Israeli per-

ceptions of Arab alternatives. Thus, it was impossible to test Holsti's fourth hypothesis in a meaningful manner.

Thus far, the analysis has been confined to the operational equivalents of the last three phases in the S - r-s - R framework. In terms of the results reported, it seems reasonable to assert that this framework does "exist" in an empirical sense. Only two of Holsti's hypotheses could be verified, although the data pointed in the general direction necessary for the verification of his first hypothesis. Given the nature of the data, it is not surprising that better results were not achieved. Since the hypotheses were devised in terms of the 1914 data which included all of the classified communications available, as well as the public documents of the decision-makers, it is not surprising that some of the hypotheses must remain unconfirmed in the present study.

In his analysis of the public documents generated by the 1956 Suez crisis, Siverson utilized an index of injury that was derived from the one created by the Stanford group.⁴⁹ It is worthwhile to derive a similar index from the present data. The Index of Injury was calculated using the following formula:

⁴⁹Siverson, op. cit., p. 161.

Units of Hostility as Target + Units of Friendship
as Agent

Units of Hostility as Agent + Units of Friendship
as Target

Holsti and North referred to this Index as an index of paranoia, at least in relation to the Kaiser's perceptions of his environment prior to World War I.⁵⁰ There were preliminary indications that a similar feeling existed among Israeli leaders, at least insofar as they expressed their fears about the scope of the Arab menace against Israel:

They (the Arabs) have threatened Israel and the World with total war. They have threatened to destroy the independence of my country and to extinguish the existence of my people.⁵¹

To construct an index of injury it was necessary to recode all action and threat statements as to whether they perceived Israel as the agent or target of hostility. Likewise, all statements in the friendship category were recoded to distinguish between Israel as the agent or target of friendship. Table XVII presents the data and the final index.

⁵⁰O.R. Holsti and R.C. North, "The History of Human Conflict," in E.B. McNeil (ed.), The Nature of Human Conflict (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 163.

⁵¹Provisional Records of the Security Council, S/PV1345, p. 61.

TABLE XVII
INDEX OF INJURY

Period	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Hostility											
-Agent	19	16	5	3	8	3	9	4	0	13	35
-Target	95	98	21	13	28	15	25	23	4	41	323
Friend-ship											
-Agent	0	1	0	7	0	0	0	2	2	2	27
-Target	0	2	0	4	0	0	0	1	2	0	23
Index	5.00	5.50	4.20	2.86	3.50	5.00	2.78	5.00	3.00	3.31	6.21

The index tends to substantiate the rest of the analysis thus far presented, although as an indicator of the degree of Arab-Israeli conflict, it is less sensitive than either the scaled perceived actions or the percentage of narrowed alternatives. The degree to which Israel perceived herself as being "injured" across the five month period is noteworthy in itself. Again, this substantiates the general conclusion that the typical Israeli view of relations with the Arab nations during that period was highly negative.

In conjunction with the Index of Injury, North and Holsti verified the following hypothesis which was applied to German perceptions during the 1914 crisis:

"Perceptions of inferior capability, if perceptions of anxiety, fear, threat, or injury are great enough, will fail to deter a nation from going to war."⁵²

In the present study, using the category of perceptions of power, an attempt was made to bring data to bear on this hypothesis. Table XI shows that perceptions of power became more salient in May, which meant that the above hypothesis could not be verified.

Very little can be said about the perceptions recorded in the peace category, because the relative frequencies of these perceptions were quite erratic across the eleven time periods. It is worth noting that this category was relatively salient, which indicates that Israeli decision-makers, in spite of the level and intensity of hostilities, were interested in bringing an end to the conflict. The perceptions themselves tended to be of a very vague and general nature which would seem to indicate that Israeli leaders did not see many short run methods by which peace could be achieved. This fact reflects one of the dilemmas of the Israeli situation in the Middle East--in the long run, they desire peace, but in the short run, they must defend themselves. The latter limitation, of course, only serves to make peace a more distant goal.

⁵²O.R. Holsti and R.C. North, op. cit., p. 169.

Section Six - Correlations Between Perceptual and Event Data

Given the fact that only public documents were used in the present study, and that an unknown sampling bias may in fact exist, it is worthwhile to perform a systematic comparison between the perceptual data and the event data used in Chapter III. Thus, although there appears to be good reasons for trusting the perceptual data, it is possible that there are discrepancies which would appear if correlations were performed.

To prepare the perceptual data, it was necessary to recode the perceived hostility category (threats and actions) in terms of the agent involved. Thus, the data was sub-categorized according to whether Syria, Jordan, or Egypt was perceived as the agent of threats or actions against Israel. The data was also recoded according to whether Israel was perceived as the agent of threats or actions against the three Arab nations. All this perceptual data was then correlated with the event data from Burrowes and Spector study and with the data from the present study.⁵³

⁵³To make the event and perceptual data comparable, it was necessary to aggregate the perceptual data into periods that were as equal as possible to the one month event data periods. The period from January 1 to May 30 was divided as follows: January 1-30, January 31-March 1, March 2-31, April 1-30, and May 1-30. Fortunately the distribution of the documents completely obviated the problem of having to include documents from January or March, for example into the February category, which would have distorted the comparison somewhat.

The results presented in Table XVIII show that five of the eight correlations were significant at the .05 level or better, one was significant at the .10 level, and two were relatively insignificant.

TABLE XVIII
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERCEPTUAL AND EVENT DATA

Data Correlated	Product-Moments	Significance Level
(1) Perceived hostility from Syria and Syrian acts towards Israel	.777	.10
(2) Perceived hostility from Egypt and Egyptian acts towards Israel	.998	.005
(3) Perceived hostility from Jordan and Jordanian acts towards Israel	.517	.25
(4) Total perceived hostility from three Arab nations with total acts towards Israel	.869	.05
(5) Perceived hostility towards Syria and total hostile acts towards Syria	.946	.005
(6) Perceived hostility towards Egypt and total hostile acts towards Egypt	.996	.005
(7) Perceived hostility towards Jordan and total hostile acts towards Jordan	.407	.25
(8) Perceived hostility towards three Arab states and hostile acts towards these states	.878	.025

The two low correlations occurred when the perceptual and event data for Jordan were compared. It is interesting that in both cases the frequency of hostile actions to and from Jordan was greater than the perceptions of these actions. There would therefore seem to have been an Israeli willingness to play down the conflict with Jordan whereas a relatively harsh perceptual view was given to Syria and Egypt. The same situation appears to be true with Syria, at least in terms of Syrian acts toward Israel. Essentially, the relatively low first correlation in the table is due to Israeli decision-makers attributing less hostility to Syria than was actually coming from Syria. This situation was verified when the addition of guerrilla activities to the Syrian conflict totals across the five months actually lowered the correlation coefficient to .723.

The generally good results of these correlations indicate that the perceptual data was relatively complete, at least in terms of the events that occurred during the period.⁵⁴

⁵⁴A different interpretation of these correlations, although less reasonable, merits explication. One could begin by assuming that the perceptual data is relatively uniform across the five months being studied. The good correlations obtained would therefore reflect the comparability of the two sets of event data used.

Summary

In this chapter, the crisis decision-making framework developed in Chapter I was tested. The results were generally good inasmuch as the presence of increasing stress was verified (and distinguished from crisis) and two of Liblasi's hypotheses were verified. The fact that two hypotheses were not verified reflects the limits of the data used for this study.

To broaden the scope of the analysis, an index of injury was derived. Its features supported, in a general manner, the results derived within the context of operationalizing the S - r-s - R framework. Correlations performed between the perceptual and event data strengthened the assumption that the perceptual data generally reflected the events that did in fact occur.

CONCLUSIONS

This study has approached the period prior to the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War from two complementary perspectives. In terms of subordinate systems theory, the author was able to use event data derived from the Burrowes and Spector approach to ascertain if a Middle East core of nations existed. It was possible to conclude, on the basis of the analysis done, that the Middle East core nations, including Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Israel functioned as a subsystem on a military-security dimension during the five month period prior to the Six Day War. This fact simplifies the researcher's task when he begins seeking sources that contributed to the crisis in May which ended in the War itself. Since these four nations functioned as a group, and since Israel's interactions with the entire Middle East were confined almost completely to these nations, the researcher can confine his search primarily to the Middle East core nations themselves.

The interactions analysis of the conflict dyads between Israel and her three neighbors revealed the general outlines of the Arab-Israeli situation during

the months prior to the War. The analysis, however, was limited by the fact that the unit of time used for this approach was one month, and by the fact that the conflictive acts were unweighted.

In Chapter IV, the crisis decision-making framework developed in Chapter I was operationalized. Following the work Zinnes has done, an empirical distinction was made between the concepts of crisis and stress. The general category of perceived hostility was subcategorized so that all threat statements applied to the concept of crisis, and all perceived action statements applied to the concept of stress. Using the pair-comparison scaling technique, perceived action and events themselves were scaled for intensity. This procedure verified that stress was increasing for Israeli leaders prior to the Six Day War. Two of Holsti's four hypotheses, wherein stress is related to alterations in perceptions of time and alternatives, were verified. An Index of Injury was derived and its values tended to support the rest of the results obtained from the content analysis. Correlations that were performed between the perceptual data and the event data strengthened the assumption that the perceptual data was relatively com-

lete across the five month period studied.

Within the limits imposed by the kind of data derived from public documents, it can be said that the relative saliency of the alternatives category (Table XI), and the intensity of perceived hostile actions (Table XIII), and the percentage of narrowed alternatives (Table XVI) were the best indicators of the level (and scope) of the conflict between Israel and the Arab nations during those five months. Other indicators, such as the percentage of perceptions of immediate future (Table XV), the Index of Injury (Table XVII) and the intensity of violence or potential violence of Israeli-initiated acts towards the Arab nations (Table XIV) were able to discriminate between the January and May periods, but tended to miss the tensions during the first part of April.

There is a very interesting possibility that these indicators may in fact have threshold values beyond which the probability of a major conflict increases sharply. Given the fact that the present study is but one case, it would be premature to attach numbers to these thresholds. What is needed, therefore, is more research of periods like January and May of 1967 so that values for these indicators can be derived which have some validity across

time. By studying the period prior to the Suez War, for example, one could obtain values for these indicators which would then allow the researcher to specify a range in which the probability of a major conflict becomes very high.

The fact that reasonably good results were obtained in this study of crisis decision-making indicates that more studies of this kind might be undertaken, using public documents alone. Since the ultimate test of such endeavors would be their ability to explain and predict, it may be possible to obviate the need to wait until archives are opened before crisis foreign policy decisions can be studied.

The documents used in this study did have one important weakness. Their distribution across the eleven periods made it difficult in some cases to have a great deal of confidence in the frequency distributions within individual categories. This problem was especially evident for the categories of peace and friendship. In the present study, the author utilized two week periods to capture important changes that occurred within single months. In terms of the main thrust of the perceptual analysis, this decision paid off. In a different situation, however, where these sharp changes did not occur,

it would likely strengthen any results obtained to use longer periods of analysis.

In closing, it is necessary to emphasize that the Arab-Israeli conflict is an ongoing phenomenon which continues to have world-wide implications. For this reason alone the Middle East merits a continuing and increasing share of the scholarly research into the dynamics of conflict--not just at the psychological level, but at all other levels as well.

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APPENDIX I

DEFINITIONS OF CODING CATEGORIES AND A RECORDING GUIDE FOR THE CONTENT ANALYSIS PORTION OF THE STUDY*

I. Category of Hostility - any statement in which decision-makers or governments manifest towards other decision-makers or governments behavior or attitudes which can be construed as being harmful to the latter in some way. In general, it is assumed that such behavior would obstruct the fulfillment of the other nation's policies, although this may not be explicit in the statement. Three facets of the concept can be distinguished: (1) the affective element; (2) the action element; and (3) the threat element.

Themes in this category are recoded according to the following scheme:

Agent:	Israel	Target:	Israel:	security
(threat or	Syria	(threat or		civilians
action)	U.A.R.	action)		military
	U.N.			economy
	Jordan			values
	Lebanon			general
	Arab States		Syria	
	U.S.S.R.		U.A.R.	
	Guerrillas		U.N.	
	Unspecified		Jordan	
	Others		Lebanon	
			Arab States	
			U.S.S.R.	
			Guerrillas	
			Peace	
			Unspecified	
			Others	

*These definitions are a combination of the definitions used by Vanderelst, Winham and the Stanford group.

II. Category of Time - any statement which perceives or expresses time to be a factor in the situation or expresses a sense of urgency about the situation.

This category is recoded to differentiate between perceptions of immediate or distant future. All those perceptions that cannot be easily classified are categorized with distant future perceptions.

III. Category of Alternatives - any statement which expresses a perception of (1) choice (more than one course of action), (2) necessity (only one course of action), (3) closed (some course of action not possible) and (4) impotence (some action proceeding without control) for either Israel or the enemy.

IV. Category of Friendship - any statement that expresses a sense of approbation and positive disposition between decision-makers or nations. It suggests affective ties between states that have been construed by the decision-makers as being beneficial to the fulfillment of their policy objectives.

This category is recoded to differentiate between Israel as the agent or target of friendship in relation to: U.S.A., France, Britain, U.S.S.R., Great Powers, Arab States, and the International Community.

V. Category of Power - any statement which assesses the relative strengths or weaknesses of the participants in the conflict situation. This assessment is qualitative and not quantitative or numerical.

This category is recoded to differentiate between Israeli strengths and Arab weaknesses.

VI. Category of Peace - any statement that perceives an Israeli desire for peace or the normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab nations.

This category is not recoded.

APPENDIX II

SUMMARY OF THE CODING CATEGORIES USED FOR THE EVENT DATA ANALYSIS*

External

Conflict -

1. Number of informal protests or accusations.
2. Number of informal warnings or threats.
3. Number of formal diplomatic protests or warnings.
4. Number of negative sanctions and minor unfriendly acts.
5. Number of military actions.

Cooperation -

6. Number of low-level visits or meetings.
7. Number of high-level visits or meetings.
8. Number of unilateral statements of friendship, friendly intent or common cause.
9. Number of joint statements of friendship, friendly intent or common cause.
10. Number of minor friendly acts.
11. Number of cultural, technical or minor economic agreements.
12. Number of political, military or major economic agreements.

*These categories are the same ones used in the Burrows and Spector study.

Domestic

Conflict -

13. Number of non-violent protests or demonstrations.
14. Number of violent demonstrations or riots.
15. Number of strikes or work stoppages.
16. Number of verbal demands upon or statements against the government.
17. Number of acts of terror, sabotage or assassination.
18. Number of attempted coups or revolutions.
19. Number of hostile statements or declarations by the government and denials.
20. Number of governmental acts imposing general restrictions or curtailing liberties.
21. Number of punitive acts against specific non-elites.
22. Number of punitive acts against specific elites.

Cooperation -

23. Number of governmental appeals for unity or support.
24. Number of governmental acts designed to generate support.
25. Number of acts lifting restrictions or curtailments of liberties.
26. Number of pledges of support or endorsement of the government and/or its policies.

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